might have participated in the act;110 ii) that the purpose is compatible with the Convention;111 that is, to ensure that the accused will not obstruct the proceedings or evade justice112 and that the measures are appropriate, necessary and strictly proportionate to that end113 and iii) that the decision contains sufficient grounds that would permit its evaluation on whether it adjusts to the indicated conditions.114 Any restriction to liberty that is not based on a justification that will allow an assessment of whether it is adapted to the conditions set out above will be arbitrary and will, thus, violate Article 7(3) of the Convention.115 99. On the other hand, in order to guarantee that a preventive deprivation of liberty is not arbitrary, it “should be subject to periodic review so that it does not continue when the reasons for its adoption no longer exist. […] Similarly, with every request for the release of the detainee, the judge must explain, even minimally, the reasons for which he considers that the preventive detention should be maintained.”116. The Court has clarified that “this must not be, per se, an element that can negatively affect the principle of the presumption of innocence established in Article 8(2) of the Convention. On the contrary, it is an additional element to the other requirements. This decision must not have any effect on the judge regarding the responsibility of the accused. The suspicion must be based on specific acts and be articulated, that is, not on mere conjecture or abstract intuition. That means that the State cannot detain in order to later investigate, but rather it is only authorized to deprive the liberty of an individual when there is sufficient reason to prosecute him” (cf. Case of Servellón García et al. v. Honduras, para. 90 and Case of Carranza Alarcón v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparationes and Costs. Judgment of February 3, 2020. Series C No. 399, para. 75 and footnote on page 44). 110 Cf. Case of Servellón García et al. v. Honduras, para. 90 and Case of Villarroel Merino et al. v. Ecuador, para. 87. 111 Cf. Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 20, 1999. Series C No. 44, para. 77 and Case of Villarroel Merino et al. v. Ecuador, para. 88. 112 Cf. Case of Tibi v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 7, 2004. Series C No. 114, para. 106 and Case of Carranza Alarcón v. Ecuador, para. 75. In the same sense, the Case of Villarroel Merino et al. v. Ecuador, para. 87. The characteristics that a measure of deprivation of liberty must meet are the following: “i) appropriateness: the propensity of the means to achieve the end pursued; ii) necessity: that the measure must be absolutely essential to achieve the purpose sought and that, among all possible measures, there is no less burdensome one in relation to the right involved that would be suitable to achieve the proposed objective, and iii) strict proportionality: that the sacrifice inherent in the restriction of the right to liberty is not exaggerated or excessive compared to the advantages obtained from this restriction and the achievement of the purpose sought.” (cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, para. 92 and Case of Carranza Alarcón v. Ecuador, footnote on page 47). 113 Cf. Case of García Asto and Ramírez Rojas v. Peru. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 25, 2005. Series C No. 137, para. 128 and Case of Villarroel Merino et al. v. Ecuador, para. 87. The Court has made clear that “the requirement of a motive is related to judicial guarantees (Article 8(1) of the Convention. In addition, in order that the presumption of innocence is respected (Article 8(2) in ordering precautionary measures that restrict liberty, it is necessary that the State clearly substantiate and accredit, according to each specific case, the existence of the requirements established by the Convention” (cf. Case of Carranza Alarcón v. Ecuador, footnote on page 48). 114 115 Cf. Case of García Asto and Ramírez Rojas v. Peru, para. 128 and Case of Carranza Alarcón v. Ecuador, para 75. In the same sense, Case of Villarroel Merino et al. v. Ecuador, para. 91. Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, paras. 107 and 117 and Case of Carranza Alarcón v. Ecuador, para. 83. See also, Case of Villarroel Merino et al. v. Ecuador, para. 92. The Court in the latter case held that “the judge must periodically evaluate whether the reasons, necessity and proportionality of the measure exist and whether the period of detention has surpassed the limits imposed by the law and by reason. An order of release must be decreed whenever the preventive detention does not satisfy these conditions. In evaluating the continuation of the measure, the authorities must give sufficient grounds that would allow knowing the reasons for which the restriction of liberty has been maintained, which, in order that it be compatible with Article 7(3) of the Convention, must be based on the necessity of ensuring that the detainee will not obstruct the efficient development of the investigations or evade the actions of justice.” 116 27