determined how such arbitrariness implied a violation of the presumption of innocence during those measures. Therefore, the question has already been analyzed by the Court and it is not relevant to examine it in relation to Article 7(5) of the Convention. 123. In view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that, with regard to the preventive measures of deprivation of liberty, the State violated the right to personal liberty, recognized in Article 7(1) and (3) of the Convention, as well as the right to judicial guarantees, for contravening the principle of the presumption of innocence, established in Article 8(2), in relation to the obligations established in Articles 1(1) and 2 thereof, to the detriment of Belkis González, María Angélica González, Fernando González, Luis Guillermo González, Wilmer Antonio Barliza and Olimpiades González. B.3 Right to appeal the detentions 124. The Commission and the representatives alleged that the State violated the right of the victims to have appropriate and effective legal remedies to protect their right to personal liberty (supra para. 88). The Court finds it appropriate to examine this question on the basis of Article 7(6) of the Convention, which is the specific provision in the treaty on the judicial oversight of personal liberty. Therefore, the Court does not consider it necessary to analyze the allegations and facts relating to Article 25 of the Convention.140 125. The facts of the case indicate that, on December 2, 1998, Fernando González and María Angélica González, while detained, requested that the intervening judicial body grant them an alternative measure of preventive detention, as did Luis Guillermo González, Wilmer Antonio Barliza and Olimpiades González on February 5, 1999, after they had been detained. The judicial decisions that confirmed the deprivations of liberty ordered by the police occurred, respectively, on December 10, 1998 and February 12, 1999. On January 8, 1999, Belkis González, María Angélica González and Fernando González appealed their deprivations of liberty and the appeal was rejected on January 28, 1999. Wilmer Barliza González, Luis Guillermo González and Olimpiades González appealed the decision of their preventive detentions on March 5, 1999 and the appeal was resolved on April 21, 1999, confirming the measure of the first and revoking it with respect to the other two. On August 2, 1999, the representatives of the four persons who remained deprived of their liberty requested an alternate measure of deprivation of liberty, based on the COPP. That request was repeated on August 16, 1999 and denied the same day. 126. The Court must now evaluate whether the State observed Article 7(6) of the Convention with respect to three groups of facts: a) the requests of alternative measures of preventive detention filed on December 2, 1998 and February 5, 1999; b) the appeals of the decisions of preventive deprivations of liberty filed on January 8 and March 5, 1999, and c) the request for alternative measures of deprivation of liberty filed on August 2, 1999 and repeated on August 16. 127. In the first place, with regard to the requirements of alternative measures of the deprivation of liberty formulated before the judicial decisions that confirmed the detentions, the Court notes that they were not directed to question the legality of the measures. In effect, a reading of those requests shows that what was being asked was that, in the event that the detentions were lawful, alternate measures be ordered. Cf. Case of Anzualdo Castro v. Peru. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 22, 2009. Series C No. 202, para. 77 and Case of Villarroel Merino et al. v. Ecuador, para. 109. 140 34