21 (b) The norm in question was modified in 1994, 1995 and 1996, extending the death penalty to conducts that constituted kidnapping, and which did not call for this punishment when the American Convention was ratified. The third reform, carried out by Legislative Decree No. 81/96, in force in Guatemala since October 21, 1996, prescribed the death penalty as the only punishment applicable for the crime of kidnapping in all its forms; (c) While the juridical right protected by the penal regime in force in 1973 was the life of the person kidnapped, the violation of which was punishable by the death penalty, under the 1996 reform, the juridical right protected is the freedom of the person kidnapped. Consequently, it is not reasonable to conclude, as did the Guatemalan authorities, that both texts describe the same category of crime, even though both offenses have the same name; (d) The application of the death penalty to Mr. Raxcacó Reyes, for a crime for which it was not established by law when Guatemala became a party to the American Convention, constitutes a violation of Article 4(2) of this instrument, in relation to the general obligation to respect and guarantee rights established in Article 1(1) thereof. 46. The Commission also argued that the State’s punitive powers are limited juridically by the obligations assumed on ratifying international treaties and by the development of international human rights law. Consequently, the States have a margin of discretion to determine the severity of the punishment for a specific act. In this context, with regard to capital punishment, the punishment must be proportionate to the harm that the criminal act has caused to the victim and to society. For the crime of simple kidnapping, the punishment of the death penalty is disproportionate and excessive. 47. In relation to Article 4(6) of the Convention, the Commission argued that: (a) At the end of May 2000, the Guatemalan Congress revoked Legislative Decree No. 159 of 1892 (the Pardon Law), which established the procedure for processing petitions for clemency before the President of the Republic. Accordingly, by abstaining from regulating the procedure for guaranteeing the access of those sentenced to death to the remedy of pardon or amnesty, as established in Article 4(6) of the American Convention, the State has committed a violation that entails international responsibility; (b) The right to apply for pardon includes certain minimum procedural guarantees for those sentenced to death to ensure that this right is respected and may be enjoyed effectively. These protections include the right of the condemned man to apply for pardon, to be informed of when the competent authority will consider his case, to present arguments before the competent authority, and to receive a decision within a reasonable time before his execution; and (c) With regard to the specific situation of Mr. Raxcacó Reyes, his defense lawyer could not apply for pardon or commutation of sentence before the President of the Republic, because the decree regulating this remedy had been revoked; therefore, it was not possible to file this remedy. The absence of a law regulating the remedy of pardon denies those sentenced to death, in this case Mr. Raxcacó Reyes, the right of access to a clemency procedure in