civil sanctions for the abusive exercise of freedom of expression, when crimes of slander or insult are established. 6. The application of this analytical methodology has allowed the Court to view, with sufficient flexibility and prudence, the different cases that have involved the application of subsequent liability for statements that interfere with other rights protected by the American Convention, when there is an abusive exercise of freedom of expression that constituted a crime. This has allowed it to distinguish cases where the application of a criminal sanction for the crime of slander and libel resulted in an abuse of criminal law by the State and a violation of freedom of expression 1, from those cases where it was considered that the application of a similar sanction was legitimate considering the seriousness of the conduct of the person who issued opinions that justified the application of criminal sanctions 2. The analytical methodology has made it possible to draw fundamental distinctions in different factual hypotheses that arise in specific cases, which adequately weight the different rights that are at stake. 7. Within this conceptual framework of analysis, the Court has established that the State can decide what sanctions are necessary to harmonize the right to freedom of expression and the other human rights that may be at stake, such as honor. Of course, the recognition of this state power is not absolute, and it has been reasoned that criminal law should be used as the ultima ratio in the face of the most serious attacks that damage or endanger other fundamental legal rights. Thus, criminal law should only be used when it corresponds to the existence of serious injuries to said rights, and is closely related to the magnitude of the damage that is caused. The examination of when a criminal sanction relates to the Convention is qualified taking into account the various factors that surround the necessity and proportionality of a measure, such as the nature of the statements (whether they are opinions or facts), the person to whom they are addressed, whether they are matters of public interest, and if the sanctions imposed were proportional to the damage caused. 8. For example, in the case of Kimel v. Argentina, it was concluded that, although the application of a criminal sanction against Mr. Kimel pursued a legitimate purpose, that is, to protect the honor of a public official, said sanction was unnecessary due to the repercussion it had on the complainant’s legal interests, and it was also disproportionate. In relation to this last point, the Court considered the degree of impairment of the plaintiff's legal interests, the importance of satisfying the opposing interest, and whether the satisfaction of the first justifies the restriction of the other. It is in this analysis that it considered that "in some cases the balance will be tilted to the prevalence of freedom of thought and expression, while in others it will be tilted to safeguarding the right to have one’s honor respected." When carrying out the specific analysis, the Court took into consideration that public officials are more exposed to criticism, that the threshold for protection of freedom of expression is broader in debates of public interest, and that Mr. Kimel's statements constituted opinions. Thus, the Court concluded that in the case the application of a criminal sanction was obviously disproportionate. 3 9. In contrast, in the case of Memoli v. Argentina, the Court concluded that the imposition of a criminal sanction for the crime of libel did not lead to a violation of the right to freedom of expression, since said sanctions are provided for in the law, served a legitimate purpose (protecting the reputation of others) and were proportionate. As part of the analysis of proportionality, the Court took into account the analysis carried out by the domestic judicial 1 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 2, 2008. Series C No. 177., par. 80. Cf. Case of Mémoli v. Argentina. Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 22, 2013, Series C No. 265., par. 139. 2 3 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 2, 2008. Series C No. 177., par. 68-94. 2