authorities that had qualified that the said matter under analysis had overstepped the range of opinion for the purpose of slandering, and that there was an animus injuriandi or malice. Similarly, the Court noted that the weighting carried out by the domestic authorities between freedom of expression and the right to honor was adequate, justifying the imposition of the criminal sanction. 4 It should be noted that the case does not refer to opinions expressed on the action of public officials, nor on matters of public interest, but rather in actions between individuals. These elements, although not decisive, influence the assessment of the specific case. 10. This case differs from the way in which the Court has classified the imposition of subsequent liabilities in most of its case law, since it reiterates, following the same analysis as in the case of Álvarez Ramos v. Venezuela, the criterion under which an opinion article, produced by a journalist regarding the acts of a public official carrying out their duties, cannot be subject to a criminal sanction (par. 120). In this way, the judgment affirms that in the case of the article "NO to lies", since it is an opinion article criticizing the actions of then President Rafael Correa Delgado, regarding facts of well-known public interest, the existence of criminal proceedings and a sanction constitutes per se a violation of the right to freedom of expression in terms of Article 13 of the American Convention. 11. The position taken by the majority in this case, despite the fact that it may be motivated by noble intentions to expand the protection of freedom of expression in the region, has a series of difficulties that it is pertinent to point out. In the first place, Article 13(2) of the Convention does not exclude the possibility of a criminal sanction to ensure "respect for the rights or reputation of others", or "the protection of national security, public order or public health or morals”. What it expressly prohibits is prior censorship, which is a characteristic of the broad protection of freedom of expression, but which cannot be extrapolated to other aspects without disrupting the meaning of said protection. Of course, the excessive use of criminal law to establish subsequent liability results in a violation of freedom of expression. This is not the case when it is used as a means to protect relevant legal interests (such as other rights), in accordance with the very conditions established by the Convention. 12. The precedents of the Court prior to the case of Álvarez Ramos have been consistent in that the classification of the crime of libel and slander must comply with the principle of legality and minimal intervention and criminal law as ultima ratio. In addition, that the use of criminal law for the protection of other rights must be analyzed with special caution, taking into account the intent of the person who issued the opinions, the characteristics of the damage caused, and the degree of protection given to certain statements (for example, those of public interest that involve the acts of authorities) in order to qualify whether the use of criminal law is legitimate. These conditions are analyzed when evaluating the need for the measure and when the proportionality of the sanction is assessed. It has also been recognized that the burden of proof rests with the decision maker. Thus, the Court has been able to give greater protection to speeches of opinion which have a public interest, and which refer to the authorities, without establishing an absolute rule that prohibits the imposition of said sanctions. 13. In addition to the norm, and most of the Court's case law, it is important not to lose sight of the possibility of criminal sanctions being applied in the case of the most serious violations of other fundamental rights (such as the honor and dignity) being of special relevance to maintain a healthy balance between the different rights recognized by the American Convention. It is important to keep in mind that opinions, even when referring to issues of public interest, can cause serious damage to fundamental interests for a public 4 Cf. Case of Mémoli v. Argentina. Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 22, 2013, Series C No. 265., par. 129-149. 3