again forced the members of the Court to issue a single vote in favor or against all the aspects analyzed in the central controversy, even when it is evident that each right has autonomy in the analysis of the case. The “unified” conclusion in the operative points does not make it possible to show the aspects where there are agreements or divergences among the judges. In my particular case, it did not allow me to state my differing position regarding the violation of the rights to freedom of expression and the right of movement of Mr. Palacio Urrutia, an issue with which I agree, and my dissent regarding the declaration of responsibility for the violation of the right to work in terms of article 26 of the Convention. 18. Regarding this last point, the Court declared the violation of Mr. Palacio Urrutia's right to job stability in terms of Article 26 of the Convention. My dissent regarding the use of said article as a device to analyze individual violations of ESCER, which I have pointed out on multiple occasions and reiterate in this vote, is based on the fact that article 26 of the Convention does not recognize the right to job stability and refers to the progressive obligations that the State assumes with respect to ESCER. Mr. Palacio Urrutia effectively had to leave the country due to the conflict he had with the then President and the threats he received from third parties, which led to his being granted asylum status in the United States of America (par. 149). Hence, the Judgment recognizes that there was a violation of his right to movement and residence. 19. However, it was unnecessary to address the right to job security in a differentiated manner. This is so because a) the analysis of the judgment is weakened when rights that are not recognized by the American Convention are invoked, b) the facts related to the impact that the violations in the case had on Mr. Palacio Urrutia’s work could have been addressed in the sections corresponding to the analysis of the right to freedom of expression and movement, and c) the reparations in the case could have included those related to the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage suffered by the victim due to his departure from the country, which would have included the amounts not received due to his resignation from El Universo. In other words, we are faced with a case where the invocation and autonomous analysis of Article 26 of the Convention is superfluous, and weakens rather than strengthens the analysis of this judgment. III. Regarding the State’s acknowledgment of international responsibility and the participation of third parties in the process 20. Finally, with regard to this concurring opinion, it is relevant to refer to the State's actions throughout the process and the objections to the legitimacy of its acknowledgment of responsibility raised by the then President Rafael Correa in the amicus curiae submitted to the Court (par. 11). In this regard, it should be recalled that the State acknowledged its international responsibility regarding the facts presented by the Commission and the representatives and their legal consequences regarding the criminal proceeding against the victims, as well as some specific events subsequent to said proceedings (par. 18). Rafael Correa asked to appear before the Court as a witness to present his version of the facts in the case, and when said request was rejected, he presented an amicus curiae brief alleging, inter alia, that the State's acknowledgment of responsibility had a political and not legal motivation, which seeks to cause damage to his image and good name (par. 11). 21. The request of the then President was rejected by the Court, at the appropriate procedural moment, because the Court’s Rules of Procedure do not provide for third parties unrelated to the process to present evidence, and in this sense, the only appropriate procedural route for the presentation of factual and legal considerations was in the form of an amicus curiae. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the State has the power to recognize the facts, rights and reparations that it considers pertinent as part of the process, which are qualified by the Court at the time of issuing its judgment and at the time of ruling on them, 5