21. On that occasion, and based on a popular consultation convened by the Executive Branch without a prior review of constitutionality by the highest national court, as required by the State Constitution, the Executive Branch was given the power to remove the directors of that body and to nominate others. The majority of the Court decided that it was an issue that should be resolved as a matter of merit, without the provisional measures requested by the Commission being appropriate at that moment. 22. I then pointed out in my dissenting opinion: The question of merit, which the Court cannot know in proposing mere provisional measures, is whether the removal of the Councilors affects the democratic structure of the State, and what would happen if it means a concentration or distortion of power that leads to disregard of plural democracy. Although popular consultation, the referendum, the plebiscite and other forms of direct democracy do not affect the democratic system in principle, since they are provided for in many constitutional systems, there are undeniable and sad historical experiences, even theorized and rationalized in the doctrinal field, which, by these or by other means, where the circumstantial majority result was used to suppress the rights of the minority, rights whose preservation forms the essence of the concept of open society. Cf. Peter Häberle, Europäische Verfassungslehre, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2006, p. 299. 23. I added at the time that there was a serious risk of undermining plural democracy by granting excessive powers to the executive that called for the consultation, close to the apex of public authority, with the possibility that the system would develop into one of the so-called plebiscitary democracies of the type postulated by Carl Schmitt 10, which would be contrary to the prescription by numerous international instruments that are well known enough not to need stating. 24. In this regard I pointed out: It is widely known and emphasized by the constitutional doctrine of democratic States of law that, although the majority principle is the basis of democracy, it should not be understood in an absolute sense, since such an understanding, in its extreme limit, it would give rise to a totalitarian democracy (Cf. Livio Paladin, Diritto Costituzionale, Padova, 2006, p. 263), like the one established in the old Soviet constitution, since it would not guarantee the possibility of alternation in power (cf. Enrico Spagna Musso, Diritto Costituzionale, Padova, 1992, p. 151). The general principle seems to be that the majority cannot deny the rights of the minority, since doing so would deny the majority's own right to change their minds. Similarly, the limits of any constitutional reform and even the existence of the so-called "eternal clauses" are widely debated and problematic in this sense, as would be the republican principle for us (cf. Peter Häberle, El Estado Constitucional, Buenos Aires, 2007, p. 258). 25. I concluded on that occasion maintaining that the position of the majority, according to which it was an issue that should be resolved in its entirety as a matter of merit and without distinguishing what at the time corresponded to a provisional measure, taking into account the prolonged processing time to reach the merits stage, would allow irreparable institutional damage to occur: If the Councilors for whom provisional measures are requested are replaced before the State submits the conflict to its highest internal instance, the possible alleged injury to the democratic system would have been committed, given that in the event that the highest national court found that the petitioners were right, the new Councilors would have been able to carry out acts whose legal validity would be questionable or invalid, with very serious injury to legal certainty and the stability of the rights of the citizens. 10 Der Begriff des Politischen, (1932), Berlin, 1963. 4