34 assume that the accused were on active duty at the time of the events.”75 Thus, the motion for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was formally brought before the Supreme Court. 82(17) On December 5, 1996, the Supreme Court decided on the motion for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction (supra para. 82(16)) and found that “jurisdiction over the case lies on the Second Military Court of Santiago, to which the case should be submitted.”76 82(18) On December 16, 1996, the Second Military Court of Santiago initiated the investigation through the Second Military and Police Prosecutor’s Office of Santiago.77 On January 13, 1997, said Military Court took over and joined case No. 40.184, until then under the charge of the First Criminal Court of Rancagua, with case No. 876-96, under its charge.78 82(19) On January 14, 1997, the Second Military and Police Prosecutor’s Office of Santiago requested the Second Military Court of Santiago to “order the full and final dismissal of the proceedings [based] on the statute of limitations regarding the criminal liability” of Castro-Osorio and Neveu-Cortesi, pursuant to Decree Law No. 2.191.79 82(20) On January 28, 1997, the Second Military Court of Santiago, without analyzing the evidence or deciding on the conclusion of the investigation, ordered the final dismissal of the case, pursuant to Decree Law No. 2.191. In the whereas clauses of its resolution, the Military Court pointed out that: the foundations of law rest on two values which are inherent to it, justice and legal certainty. As long as legal rules are based on these values, the law may fulfill its ultimate goal; i.e. social peace. Amnesty is a concept founded on legal certainty which, to a certain extent, can do without justice in order to achieve social peace, which is the essential and ultimate goal of law that justifies its very existence. […] [A] Constitutional State such as Chile is reflected, among other basic conducts, in the rule of law; therefore, the legal amnesty rule cannot be disregarded without affecting legality and the constitutional order inherent to it. [T]he effects of amnesty go back to the date on which the offense was committed; therefore, once an amnesty law is passed and after establishing that the event occurred within the period covered by said law, all pending proceedings shall be definitely discontinued.” […] 75 Cf. Resolution of the First Criminal Court of Rancagua of October 7, 1996, (record of appendixes to the State’s final written arguments, Appendix 1, folio 1916). 76 Cf. Resolution of the Supreme Court of Justice of December 5, 1996, (record of appendixes to the State’s final written arguments, Appendix 1, folio 1931). 77 Cf. Resolution of the Second Military Court of Santiago of December 16, 1996, (record of appendixes to the State’s final written arguments, Appendix 1, folio 1933). 78 Cf. Resolution of the Second Military Court of Santiago of January 13, 1997, (record of appendixes to the State’s final written arguments, Appendix 1, folio 1970). 79 Cf. Communication of January 14, 1997 of the Second Military and Police Prosecutor’s Office of Santiago, (record of appendixes to the State’s final written arguments, Appendix 1, folios 1934 and 1935).