abandoned. All the regional instruments include the prohibition of servitude, and this was considered a practice analogous to slavery by, inter alia, the European Court of Human Rights,414 the Ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the Special Court for Sierra Leone and other specialized bodies (supra paras. 259 to 268). 276. On this basis, the Court notes that the absolute prohibition of traditional slavery and its interpretation have evolved so that it also includes certain analogous forms of this phenomenon, which are revealed in different ways at the present time, but retain certain essential characteristics that are common to traditional slavery, such as the exercise of control over an individual by physical or psychological coercion in such a way that it entails the loss of the individual’s autonomy and his unwilling exploitation.415 Accordingly, the InterAmerican Court considers that servitude is a practice analogous to slavery and should receive the same protection and involve the same obligations as traditional slavery. 277. Consequently, the Court will define the scope of the prohibition established in Article 6(1) of the Convention. To this end, it finds it useful and appropriate to examine the evolution that has occurred on this issue in international human rights law. 278. As indicated previously, the 1956 Supplementary Convention defined practices similar to slavery as serfdom,416 and debt bondage,417 inter alia.418 279. The European Court of Human Rights, in the case of Siliadin v. France mentioned above, determined that servitude consisted in “the obligation to perform certain services for others […] that is imposed by the use of coercion,” and “the obligation for the ‘serf’ to live on another person's property and the impossibility of altering his condition.”419 Subsequently, the European Court observed that servitude corresponded to “‘aggravated’ forced or 414 ECHR, Case of Siliadin v. France, para. 124. The Appeals Chamber of the Ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia also understood this when it asserted that: “117. The Appeals Chamber accepts the chief thesis of the Trial Chamber that the traditional concept of slavery, as defined in the 1926 Slavery Convention and often referred to as “chattel slavery”, has evolved to encompass various contemporary forms of slavery which are also based on the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership. In the case of these various contemporary forms of slavery, the victim is not subject to the exercise of the more extreme rights of ownership associated with “chattel slavery”, but in all cases, as a result of the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership, there is some destruction of the juridical personality; the destruction is greater in the case of “chattel slavery” but the difference is one of degree. The Appeals Chamber considers that, at the time relevant to the alleged crimes, these contemporary forms of slavery formed part of enslavement as a crime against humanity under customary international law.” ICTY, Case of Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Appeals Chamber, para. 117. 415 “Serfdom, that is to say, the condition or status of a tenant who is by law, custom or agreement bound to live and labour on land belonging to another person and to render some determinate service to such other person, whether for reward or not, and is not free to change his status. 1956 Convention, Article 1. 416 Debt bondage, that is to say, the status or condition arising from a pledge by a debtor of his personal services or of those of a person under his control as security for a debt, if the value of those services as reasonably assessed is not applied towards the liquidation of the debt or the length and nature of those services are not respectively limited and defined. 1956 Convention, Article 1. 417 418 Any institution or practice whereby: (i) A woman, without the right to refuse, is promised or given in marriage on payment of a consideration in money or in kind to her parents, guardian, family or any other person or group; or (ii) The husband of a woman, his family, or his clan, has the right to transfer her to another person for value received or otherwise; or (iii) A woman on the death of her husband is liable to be inherited by another person; (iv) Any institution or practice whereby a child or young person under the age of 18 years, is delivered by either or both of his natural parents or by his guardian to another person, whether for reward or not, with a view to the exploitation of the child or young person or of his labour. 1956 Convention, Article 1. 419 ECHR, Case of Siliadin v. France, para. 123. 72