33 123. Despite the provisions of the preceding constitutional and legal norms, as the representatives mentioned, TRIFE “[…] did issued rulings on the constitutionality of legal norms concerning electoral matters.” 124. Notwithstanding the above, in May 2002, the plenary session of the Supreme Court of Justice decided a contradiction between the criteria of the TRIFE Superior Chamber and the Supreme Court of Justice. On that occasion, the Supreme Court interpreted, as binding case law for the Electoral Tribunal, pursuant to Articles 235 and 236 of the Law on the Federal Judiciary,37 that the Constitution did not allow the Electoral Tribunal to control the constitutionality of electoral laws as a result of acts and decisions in which they had been applied, because the only control of the constitutionality of laws allowed by the Constitution was the control with general effects, which was the exclusive competence of the Supreme Court of Justice by means of the unconstitutionality proceeding. Hence, the Supreme Court indicated that: ELECTORAL LAWS. THE ONLY MEANS OF CONTESTING THEM IS THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY PROCEEDING. Article 105, subparagraph II, of the Constitution of the United Mexican States, and the law regulating it, […] establish the system for […] contesting [federal and local electoral laws]; pursuant to this, the only means of alleging the unconstitutionality of the said laws is the unconstitutionality proceeding, […] and the only authority with competence to hear and decide such actions is the National Supreme Court of Justice[.] Therefore, the Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judiciary cannot, in any circumstance, rule on the constitutionality of electoral laws, because such laws cannot be contested before it as a result of the acts and decisions in which they may have been applied, because, on the one hand, owing to their nature, they are designed to regulate the electoral process, and it is essential to consider their final nature; otherwise, the balance of the electoral process would be violated, because it would not be logical that, under a system of an electoral contest between political parties, the constitutionality of a norm on that process was questioned owing to acts and decisions produced by it; and, on the other hand, that it is beyond the powers of that tribunal to compare the electoral norm with the Constitution, even with the pretext of determining its possible inapplicability (italics added).38 125. This 2002 criteria was repeated by the Supreme Court of Justice in August 2005, when deciding the review of the application for amparo concerning the law filed by Mr. Castañeda Gutman: “Consequently, from what has been said, it is concluded that the power to decide on contradictions between electoral laws and the Constitution is entirely limited by constitutional mandate to the plenary session of the Supreme Court of Justice, while the Electoral Tribunal shall hear actions relating to any act or decision or to the interpretation of a constitutional provision, provided that this interpretation is not to verify the conformity of an electoral law with the Constitution” (italics added).39 37 Article 235. The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Justice shall be compulsory for the Electoral Tribunal when it relates to the direct interpretation of a precept of the Constitution of the United Mexican States, and in cases in which it is exactly applicable. Article 236. As established in Article 99(5) of the Constitution of the United Mexican States and section VIII of Article 10 thereof, when a Chamber of the Electoral Tribunal, directly or when deciding a contradiction in criteria, offers an opinion regarding the unconstitutionality of an act or resolution or regarding the interpretation of a precept of the Constitution itself, and this opinion may be contradictory to the one maintained by the Chambers or the Plenary session of the Supreme Court of Justice, any of the ministers, the Chambers, or the parties may denounce the contradiction so that, within ten days, the Plenary session of the Supreme Court of Justice may make a final ruling on which opinion should prevail. 38 Cf. Case law opinion 25/2002 of the Plenary session of the Supreme Court of Justice of June 10, 2002 (brief with the representatives’ pleas and arguments, merits file, tome I, folios 139 and 140). 39 Cf. Judgment of August 8 and 16 of the Plenary session of the Supreme Court of Justice deciding the appeal relating to the application for amparo 743/2005 filed by Mr. Castañeda Gutman (file of appendixs to the application, appendix 9, folio 1077).