against Mr. Cordero Bernal. 33. First, the Investigation Report of July 21, 1995, considers: I) […] it is validly concluded that, by granting unconditional release to the drug-traffickers, Hector Cordero Bernal […] has not only seriously compromised the respectability of the Judiciary, but also the dignity of the office, devaluing it […] in the opinion of the public and should therefore be dismissed from his post que […]32 [underlining added]. 34. The OCMA decision of August 3, 1995, indicates: CONCLUSION. […] Héctor Fidel Cordero Bernal, the judge appointed to the First Criminal Court of Huánuco, for the sole purpose of benefiting the defendants in the criminal proceedings he was hearing with unconditional release, an act that was further exacerbated because it concerned a crime of international illicit drug trafficking: That, this type of conduct, which borders on wilful intent, seriously undermines the gravitas of the Judiciary, the image of our institution and the dignity of its members; therefore, a disciplinary sanction must be imposed that is proportionate to the gravity of his acts: That, there should be awareness that the Judiciary is not an institution in which rights may be acquired through corrupt officials and employees; rather, the Judiciary is a power of the State, to which the life, honor and patrimony of the individual are entrusted, trust that must be reaffirmed for the citizenry, always rendering to each individual what legally corresponds to him, and any conduct that contravenes this must be sanctioned33 [underlining added]. 35. Lastly, the CNM’s decision of August 14, 1996: TENTH: That, consequently, the National Council of the Judiciary, having granted the judge subject to this proceeding the guarantee of the exercise of his right to defend himself, received his statement and the presentation of documents and the pertinent criminal case file, in other words, respecting the principles of due process, reaches the conclusion that the conduct of the defendant judge warrants a disciplinary sanction because no reasonable substantiation whatsoever can be found in the decision to prematurely grant unconditional release and such conduct is defined as an offense and is serious and, therefore, falls within the premise of Article [31.2 of the LOC]; in other words, a serious act that, without being a crime, compromises the dignity of the office and devalues it in the opinion of the public34 [underlining added]. 36. Even though both the Investigation Report and the decision of the OCMA, “classify” the action of Judge Cordero Bernal as serious, a matter referred to by the decision of the CNM, none of the three refer in detail to the other two elements that are also present – and indeterminate – in Article 31.2 of the LOC which refer to the conduct “compromises the dignity of the office” and “devalues it in the opinion of the public.” To the contrary, the Investigation Report reiterates, in general terms, that the dignity of the office had been compromised, devaluing it “in the opinion of the public” without indicating how the dignity of the office was compromised and, in particular, what is the scope of “public devaluation” in jurisdictional actions. The CNM decision contains similar wording. 37. Furthermore, the words of the CNM should be emphasized when it indicated that “the conduct of the defendant judge […] is defined as an offense and is serious and, therefore, falls within the premise of Article [31.2 of the LOC].” In this regard, I consider that the majority opinion should have considered and analyzed whether there were sufficient prior objective criteria/elements in the decision of the CNM that were applied to the case to consider that the decision was not adopted arbitrarily. Thus, the indication that the “conduct falls within” the terms of the article cannot be considered sufficient grounds if it is only indicated that “it is serious” without specifying other prior elements concerning the assessment, context and 32 Cf. The Judiciary’s Office for Control of Judges, Report of July 21, 1995, Annex 8 (folio 1103). 33 Cf. The Judiciary’s Office for Control of Judges, Report of August 3, 1995, Annex 6 (folios 1064 to 1065). 34 Cf. National Council of the Judiciary, Decision No. 008-96-PCNM of August 14, 1996, Annex 7 (folio 1074).