48 representatives do not have standing to separately and independently allege before the Court that Suriname violated Article 3 of the Convention. 161. The Court has already addressed this issue (supra Preliminary Objections, paras. 2529), and has previously held that the alleged victims or their representatives may invoke other rights distinct from those included in the Commission’s application, provided that they refer to the facts already included in the application.175 The Court observes that, although the Commission did not allege a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, the representatives’ legal arguments regarding the alleged lack of recognition of the Saramaka people’s juridical personality are based on facts already contained in the application. Thus, the Court will proceed to analyze the parties’ arguments regarding this issue. 162. Substantially, the State first questioned the cohesion of the Saramaka people as “an independent bearer of rights and obligations governed by its own laws, regulations and customs, as the concept of judicial [sic] personality provided for in [A]rticle 3 of the Convention presumes.” Secondly, the State argued that the American Convention guarantees that every “person” has the right to be recognized as such before the law and not as a “distinct people”, as argued by the representatives. Finally, the State argued that it is possible for the Saramaka people to “approach the civil courts requesting a declaratory decision recognizing the tribe as a legal entity.” 163. The Court will address the State’s first two arguments in the present section, and the last argument, concerning the possible available domestic remedies, in the section concerning the right to judicial protection (infra paras. 176-185). 164. The State’s first argument is that the voluntary inclusion of some of the members of the Saramaka people in “modern society” has affected their cultural distinctiveness, such that it would be difficult to define them as a distinct legal personality. That is, the State questions whether the Saramaka can be legally defined in a way that takes into account the different degrees to which various self-identified members of the Saramaka people adhere to traditional laws, customs, and economy, particularly those living in Paramaribo or outside of the territory claimed by the Saramaka. In this regard, the Court has already declared that the Saramaka people can be defined as a distinct tribal group (supra paras. 80-84), whose members enjoy and exercise certain rights, such as the right to property, in a distinctly collective manner (supra paras. 87-96). The fact that some individual members of the Saramaka people may live outside of the traditional Saramaka territory and in a way that may differ from other Saramakas who live within the traditional territory and in accordance with Saramaka customs does not affect the distinctiveness of this tribal group nor its communal use and enjoyment of their property. Moreover, the question of whether certain self-identified members of the Saramaka people may assert certain communal rights on behalf of the juridical personality of such people is a question that must be resolved by the Saramaka people in accordance with their own traditional customs and norms, not by the State or this Court in this particular case. Accordingly, the lack of individual identification with the traditions and laws of the Saramaka by some alleged members of the community may not be used as a pretext to deny the Saramaka people their right to juridical personality. 165. Having emphasized that the Saramaka people are a distinct tribal group, whose members enjoy and exercise certain rights collectively, the Court will address the State’s 175 Cf. Case of the “Five Pensioners”, supra note 8, para. 155; Case of Escué Zapata, supra note 22, and Case of Bueno Alves, supra note 8, para. 121.