76. The Commission also noted that when Mr. Cortez made statements on July 21 and 30, 1997, he did so without professional defense services and without knowledge of the charges against him. It therefore concluded that the State violated Mr. Cortez’s rights to defense and to be informed of the charges against him, in violation of Article 8(2) of the Convention, paragraphs (b), (c), and (d), in conjunction with Article 1(1). 78 77. The Commission added that on November 23, 1998, the prosecutor requested the final dismissal of the case, as Mr. Cortez was not involved in the events, and that nevertheless the Court on the same day issued a summons for trial, including the alleged victim. The Commission’s view was that given the prosecutor's opinion that the defendant did not participate in the events under investigation, the principle of the presumption of innocence imposes—if the case against him continues—an “enhanced burden of substantiation” of the reasons for that prosecution. It argued that enhanced substantiation was not evident in the case and that the criminal proceedings therefore violated Mr. Cortez's right to a presumption of innocence. It concluded that Ecuador violated Article 8(2) of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1(1). 78. Lastly, the Commission noted that the proceedings against Mr. Cortez lasted for 12 years and six months: from February of 1997 to September of 2009, when the case was declared time-barred under the statute of limitations. It did not believe the State had adequately justified this duration. The Commission argued that in fact the case was stalled “for many years” and that there was no evidence that Mr. Cortez had hindered the process in any way. The Commission therefore concluded that Ecuador had violated Mr. Cortez’s right to a trial within a reasonable time, in violation of Article 8(1) of the Convention, in conjunction with Article 1(1). 79. The representatives argued that Mr. Cortez’s right (under Article 8(1) of the Convention) to be tried by “a competent, independent, and impartial judge” was violated because: (a) during his first detention, he was not brought before a competent authority; (b) during his second detention, he was put “under the authority of a [m]ilitary [j]udge who did not have jurisdiction to investigate him or try him,” as Mr. Cortez had not been a member of the armed forces since 1994; and (c) the proceedings continued for over two years in the military criminal system, which did not have jurisdiction. 80. The representatives also argued that the State violated Mr. Cortez’s right “to a hearing” established in Article 8(1) of the Convention because: (a) when he was detained on July 11, 1999, he was kept in solitary confinement for 19 consecutive days without the ability to be heard by a judicial authority; and (b) on February 28, 2000, he was detained without an existing order, and he was not brought before a judge on that occasion either. 81. The representatives also asserted that the State violated Mr. Cortez’s right under Article 8(1) of the Convention that the “orders in a trial” be substantiated. This is because “the military criminal judge [...] disregarded the opinion of the military prosecutor,” who had requested a final dismissal on November 23, 1998, instead “summoning on the same day [...] four individuals to trial, including [Mr.] Cortez.” They added that: (a) “no grounds were provided for either of the pretrial detention orders,” (b) the military judge “did not state the grounds for his jurisdiction over a civilian,” and (c) the Mayor of Quito “rejected in limine” the habeas corpus requests without providing a justification. 78 Paragraph 94 of the Merits Report, in which the Commission made this argument, mentioned only paragraphs (b) and (c). However, in its conclusion (in paragraph 96 of that document), it added paragraph (d) of Article 8 of the Convention. In its final written arguments, it stated that all three of the paragraphs had been violated. 19