101. It is evident from the Merits Report that the Commission sees in the second detention of Mr. Cortez—on July 11, 1999—a violation of his right to be informed of the reasons for his detention, as established in Article 7(4) of the Convention. 95 102. The Commission also stated that after the second detention, on July 11, 1999, Mr. Cortez was brought before a legal authority on the 30th of that month, a delay that represented a violation of his right to prompt judicial review established in Article 7(5) of the Convention. 96 103. The representatives claimed that at no point during Mr. Cortez’s three detentions were there “written detention orders” and that during the second one (which began on July, 11, 1997) he was held in solitary confinement for 19 days. They asserted that the three detentions were “arbitrary.” They also stated that “the detention” of Mr. Cortez was “unlawful.” 97 They stressed that the July 11, 1997, detention of Mr. Cortez was carried out by 11 agents of the Air Force Intelligence Service, which was “utterly excessive,” and that he was not “clearly informed of the reasons for his detention or the charges against him.” 104. The representatives explained that in accordance with the laws in effect in July of 1997, 98 Mr. Cortez should have been brought before a judge within 24 hours of his detention on the 11th of that month. However, he was kept in solitary confinement for 19 days before that happened. They also stated with regard to the events of 1997 that Mr. Cortez’s right to personal liberty was violated by the actions of the military authorities, who did not have jurisdiction. 105. In their pleadings and motions brief, the representatives asserted that Ecuador had violated Article 7 of the Convention, in conjunction with Article 1(1). 99 106. The State denied that “the event of January 1997” was a “detention.” It indicated that “because it was an appearance proceeding for Mr. Cort[ez] Espinoza to give a statement before the chief of the intelligence department and the military prosecutor for an internal investigation, it was in no way a deprivation of liberty.” 107. Ecuador also argued that Article 172 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (a supplementary code for military justice) allowed judges to order the detention of an individual when there is evidence of a crime and a presumption of the individual's responsibility. It noted that in this case, on July 11, 1997, Mr. Cortez was detained pursuant to a judicial order issued by a criminal military judge three months before the detention. 100 It added that the detention that took place in 2000 was carried out “pursuant to a preventive detention order that had been issued by the Third Criminal Judge of Pichincha a month before, in the context of the January 28, 2000, indictment,” and that the day after the detention was carried out—on 95 In its Merits Report, the Commission held that Article 7(4) had been violated, but it did not clearly explain how it had reached that conclusion. However, in discussing the lawfulness of the detentions, the Commission stated that the second one was carried out without informing Mr. Cortez of the reasons. It did not make the same assertion in the Merits Report with respect to the other detentions. In its final written observations, it noted that when Mr. Cortez was first detained, he was not informed of the reasons for that detention. 96 In its final written observations, the Commission also argued that Article 7(5) of the American Convention had been violated during Mr. Cortez’s first detention. 97 The representatives did not explicitly state which of the three detentions they considered “unlawful” or whether they were referring to all three detentions despite using the singular word. 98 The representatives stated that the 1983 Code of Criminal Procedure and the 1971 Criminal Code were in effect. 99 In their final written arguments, the representatives argued that with respect to the events of January 1997, the State had violated subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Article 7 of the Convention. 100 The State mentioned specifically “the March 19, 1997, indictment, in which the preventive detention of the defendant was ordered, and the March 24, 1997, ruling specifying how that order was to be implemented.” 24