February 29, 2000—the judge hearing the case was informed of it. The State therefore maintained that the detentions had been carried out in accordance with the constitution and the law on the basis of judicial orders. 108. In addition, the State asserted that “during the July 1997 detention, Mr. Cortez Espinoza was shown the detention order, which informed him of the charges against him.” 109. Ecuador also noted that when Mr. Cortez was detained in July of 1997, “he was immediately placed under the authority of the Military Criminal Judge of the First Aerial Zone,” and that when he was detained in February of 2000, “he was placed under the authority of theThird Criminal Judge of Pichincha without delay,” because in both cases those judges “were the judicial authorities who had jurisdiction.” It concluded that “Mr. Cortez Espinoza was taken to competent authorities when he was detained.” A.2 The pretrial detentions of Mr. Cortez 110. The Commission argued that Mr. Cortez was in preventive detention from July 30, 1997, to December 19, 1997, and from February 28, 2000, to May 11, 2000, and that in neither case were specific justifications given regarding the procedural purposes of those detentions. It asserted that, to the contrary, the facts show that the justification for the preventive deprivations of liberty was the existence of circumstantial evidence of responsibility, in accordance with the criminal legislation in force at the time. 101 The Commission therefore concluded that the preventive detentions were arbitrary, in violation of Article 7(3) of the Convention, in conjunction with Articles 1(1) and 2. It also noted that, for the same reasons, Mr. Cortez’s second pretrial detention also violated his right to a presumption of innocence, recognized in Article 8(2) of the Convention. 111. The representatives described the preventive detention of Mr. Cortez from July 30, 1997, to December of that year as “unlawful” and the one from February 28, 2000, to May 10, 2000, as “unjust.” They added that “the decision that ordered the [first] temporary detention [of Mr. Cortez] was issued by a military judge,” who did not have jurisdiction. Furthermore, they stated that “the order for the 1997 pretrial detention [...] was not reasonable in terms of duration because [Mr. Cortez] spent over five months in custody at the air base without a timely judicial response.” They also considered the preventive detention in 2000 unreasonable because “it did not respect the principle of innocence, and it did not involve a detailed analysis of the military proceedings that had already occurred.” They argued that the State had violated Article 7 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1(1). 112. The State argued that “the precautionary measures of pretrial detention ordered were the appropriate mechanisms for ensuring the appearance of the defendant in the proceedings, [in accordance with] Article 170 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in effect at the time of the events.” It thus considered the purpose legitimate and the measures suitable for achieving that purpose. It also stated that the measures were “necessary” because “the purpose, in accordance with the State’s obligation to prosecute crimes expeditiously, was to ensure the appearance of the defendant in the criminal trial.” Ecuador also stated that those measures “[were] as a rule used exceptionally.” A.3 Remedies for Mr. Cortez’s deprivations of liberty 113. The Commission noted that Mr. Cortez did not file a habeas corpus petition for the July 11, 1997, detention, and that he did file one for the February 28, 2000, detention. 101 In making this assertion, the Commission did not mention specific legal provisions. 25