the delivery of goods or services with a monetary value determined by the Court in reasonable application of sound judicial criteria and based on equity. 158 182. Regarding the claimed pecuniary damage and in connection with the consequential damage, the Court notes that the bail payment was returned to Mr. Cortez (supra para. 62) and that the representatives did not document the amount they stated the victim had to spend to cover his meals while he was deprived of his liberty. With respect to loss of earnings, the representatives’ claim is based on the loss of Mr. Cortez’s job at the company where he worked. The Court holds that as the expert Coba Mejía indicated, individuals deprived of liberty in connection with a criminal trial can suffer social stigmatization after their release, which negatively affects their lives due to a distrust of individuals who have been “in trouble with the law.” 159 It is appropriate to bear this in mind with regard to non-pecuniary damage (infra para. 184). The representatives have not been able to prove a causal nexus between Mr. Cortez’s deprivations of liberty in 1997 and the end of his employment. 160 The mere fact that his employment ended on February 25, 1997—that is, close to a month after his first detention—is not sufficient to prove a causal nexus. Nevertheless, the Court understands that Mr. Cortez could not work while he was detained, and notes his statement that after the first two detentions, he had debt from his legal expenses and had difficulty making a living. He also said that he lost his license as an aviation technician because of detentions. Accordingly, the Court sets the amount of USD 25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) in equity for pecuniary damage, which the State shall pay to Mr. Cortez. 183. In addition, the representatives demanded compensation for “harm to life plans,” noting the impact of the case on Mr. Cortez’s family and on his work prospects. With regard to the first, it must be remembered that Mr. Cortez’s relatives are not victims in this case or beneficiaries of measures of reparation (supra para. 32 and 168). With regard to the second, the Court lacks the evidence to establish a causal nexus between the facts related to the violations found in this judgment and Mr. Cortez’s reduced work prospects. Moreover, the representatives have also pointed to the inability to find work in their demands for compensation for non-pecuniary damage. Thus, it is not appropriate to set a monetary amount as reparation for “harm to life plans.” 184. Regarding compensation for non-pecuniary damage, the Court deems it appropriate to decide this on the basis of its case law as well as the circumstances of the case. The Court takes into account here the harm that violations of the rights to personal liberty and personal integrity cause by themselves. It notes, moreover, that Mr. Cortez was subjected to treatment that was at the very least cruel and inhuman, and it is reasonable to assume that the conditions he endured, beyond the suffering they caused, also affected his family, social, and work ties. This is also reflected in the psychological testimony of Mr. Bermúdez Aguinaga. Furthermore, a psychological report issued in 2013 by the state authorities describes Mr. Cortez’s “worsening sense of dignity [...] because of having been detained.” The same Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Reparations and costs, Judgment of May 26, 2001. Series C No. 77, para. 84, and Case of Deras García et al. v. Honduras, para. 123. 159 Cf. Written expert testimony of Lisset del Rocío Coba Mejía (evidence file, folios 1143–1152). It must be clarified that, in line with the purpose set for the expert testimony, the Court only takes into consideration here the general assertions the expert made about “access to work opportunities for individuals subjected to deprivations of liberty,” and not Mr. Cortez’s occasional statements on the matter in this case. 160 The representatives referred to a document, which they provided, in which the Ícaro company attests that Mr. Cortez stopped providing his services on February 25, 1997, and that while he was employed there, he fulfilled his duties correctly (cf. Ícaro S.A., Certificate issued on March 5, 1997, supra). They also presented a payroll settlement document for Mr. Cortez issued by the same company due to the conclusion of the employment relationship (cf. Payroll settlement issued by the Ícaro company on February 25, 1997 (evidence file, annex 20 to the pleadings and motions brief, folios. 887 and 888)). None of those documents states the reasons the employment relationship ended. 158 40