different procedural terms, as provided in Article 34.c) of the Civil and Commercial Procedural Code, whereby the judges shall: “Issue final and firm judgments in ordinary proceedings, unless otherwise indicated, within forty (40) or (60) days, for a single judge or court en banc, respectively.” 322 182. First, with regard to the time elapsed between the filing of the petition and serving notice of the suit, the Court reiterates its previous comment regarding the impossibility of attributing said delay to the petitioner (supra para. 168) On this point, the Court notes that, according to Article 338 of the CCPN, the judge should serve notice of suit as contemplated in the law and, in any case, if he considers that the petitioner has not correctly identified the defendant, the judge should try prevent the complete paralysis of the proceedings for 3 years, 11 months and 24 days, through the use of its procedural authority.323 The Court considers that at this procedural stage, as the file shows, the judge displayed a passive attitude. 183. Second, the Court notes that, according to Article 367 of the CPCCN, the “term for the production of evidence shall be established by the judge and shall not exceed forty days.” In the instant case the period for presenting evidence lasted from October 24, 1997 (supra para. 91) until March 2, 2000 (supra para. 98), in other words, 2 years, 3 months and 6 days. Furthermore, Article 460 CPCCN establishes that the judge shall appoint expert witnesses and “shall indicate the term within which [they] shall complete their task [and if] the order does not specify the term, it shall be understood to be fifteen days.” In the instant case, the judge appointed two expert witnesses on February 17, 1998, granting them a term of 20 days to submit their expert opinions,324 and they assumed the position on March 2, 1998 (supra para. 92). Notwithstanding the term established, the psychologist and medical experts submitted their reports on March 5, 1999 (supra para. 96) and November 15, 1999 (supra para. 96), respectively, in other words, more than one year after the established deadline. 184. Third, The Court finds that, under the provisions of Article 482 of the CPCCN, once the evidence has been produced, “the Assistant Administrative Secretary, without the need for any action by the interested parties […] shall order its addition to the file.”325 However, the petitioner was the one who had to request the certification of the evidence and closing of the period for reception of evidence (supra para. 96), in order to move forward to the next stage of the proceedings. 185. Fourth, the Court notes that, according to Article 244 of the CPCCN, “…[i]f there are no provisions to the contrary, the term to file an appeal shall be five days,” and that “all regulations regarding fees shall be subject to appeal,” and “the motion for appeal shall be 321 Article 244 CPCCN establishes that “…[u]nless stated otherwise or if there are no provisions to the contrary, the term to file an appeal shall be five days. All regulations regarding fees shall be subject to appeal, and the motion for appeal must be filed within five days of notification”. Cf. Article 244 of the CPCCN, Law 17.454/1967, text ordered by Decree 1042/1981 (file of appendices to the brief of pleadings and motions, volume VII, page 3154). 322 Article 34.3.c of the CPCCN, Law 17.454/1967, text ordered by Decree 1042/1981 (file of appendices to the brief of pleadings and motions, volume VII, page 3154). 323 Cf. Article 36.1 of the CPCCN, Law 17.454/1967, text ordered by Decree 1042/1981 (file of appendices to the brief of pleadings and motions, volume VII, page 3154). 324 Cf. Brief of the Federal Judge of First Instance of February 17, 1998, page 237. 325 Cf. Article 482 of the CPCCN, Law 17.454/1967, text ordered by Decree 1042/1981 (file of appendices to the brief of pleadings and motions, volume VII, page 3154). 59