enforcement of judgments.” It argued that “[it] cannot deem the execution of the judgment to be effective, given that it significantly reduced the original amount of the reparation given.” It pointed out that it was necessary to take into account the petitioner’s “precarious economic situation, the urgency to provide care, assistance and treatment to [Sebastián Furlán] and the need to defray court costs and legal fees, [for which reason] it was not an option for him to wait until January 2016 to redeem the bonds at their nominal value”. The Commission added that the inadequacy of the amount awarded was not based on the form of bonds, but rather on the “significant decrease in their value at the time of payment,” for which the Commission argued that “if a State adopts a policy to execute the sentence in the form of bonds, it should do so guaranteeing that the amount already paid has the value ordered at the time of payment.” 207. The representatives agreed with the Commission and further alleged that “[t]he system of payment of the judicial compensation awarded to Sebastián Furlán is in conflict with the effectiveness of the judgment and infringes the right to property”. They indicated that “[t]he form of payment established by Law 23.982 in no way implied full and immediate payment of the compensation[, which] in cases like Sebastián Furlán’s, in which the money was required to cover expenses incurred due to the person’s health condition, clearly leads to the detriment of any possibility of rehabilitation and treatment”. They argued that “[i]t is inadmissible that a State, responsible for a wrongful act to the detriment of a child that also resulted in a situation of disability, should claim the country’s alleged economic emergency in order to delay compliance with its obligation, which is essential for the proper and timely treatment and care of the victim.” They alleged that “the State failed to comply with a compensation payment awarded by a final judicial decision” and that it breached “the beneficiary’s acquired right to reparation”, given that this implied a direct impairment of the victim’s property. They further alleged that “the violation of the right to property stems from the disregard of the decision issued by a judicial body, a decision that guaranteed compensation with a clear reparatory purpose.” In addition, they alleged that “the right to health of a person with disabilities cannot be deferred based on an alleged economic benefit for the community,” even less so, when Consolidation Law 23.982 [Ley de Consolidation N° 23.982] was approved in 1991, when the financial compensation was awarded by the court and, therefore, was incorporated into the victim's property in the year 2000. 208. The State indicated that i) “the arguments of the [...] Commission and the representatives […] were erratic and inconsistent, [since] they sought to avoid discussion of the aspects related to the amount of the compensation and then express grievances regarding the differences between the amount ordered in the Judgment and the amount that Mr. Furlán actually received”; ii) “during the enforcement of the Judgment, the Argentine State faced one of the most serious and profound economic and social crises in its history, which resulted, among other things, in the devaluation of the currency, preceded by the repeal of Law 23.982 on Convertibility [Ley de Convertibilidad] which established the parity between the peso and the dollar" and iii) “the rule established, as the representatives had indicated, two options for the collection of the compensation awarded by the court: the deferred payment in cash or payment in Consolidated Bonds which could be redeemed for their full value in 16 years”; iv) it was Mr. Furlan’s own decision “to opt for the mechanism of Consolidated Bonds” and to “cash in the bonds prior to their maturity date […] established by law and below their nominal value” and v) the 30% of the fees paid to the lawyer is the result of a pactum de cuota litis freely and voluntarily agreed with his legal counsel,” and therefore the fact that the payment of such fees affected the final amount received by Mr. Furlan “is the direct consequence of said agreement, for which the State cannot be held responsible in any way.” 66