exceptionally since it is the most severe punishment that can be placed on the accused for an offense for which he or she is entitled to the presumption of innocence.122 The Court has indicated in other cases that the deprivation of liberty of someone who has been accused or indicted for an offense cannot be based on general preventive or special preventive purposes that could be attributed to the punishment.123 Therefore, it has indicated that the rule should be that such a person should be at liberty while his or her criminal responsibility is being resolved.124 98. In view of the above, the judicial authority can only impose measures of this nature when it is shown that: “(a) the purpose of the measures that deprive or restrict liberty is compatible with the Convention; (b) that the measures adopted are appropriate to meet the purpose sought; (c) that they are necessary, in the sense that they are absolutely essential to achieve the purpose sought, and that, among all possible measures, there is no less burdensome one in relation to the right involved that would be as suitable to achieve the proposed objective, and (d) that they are strictly proportionate, so that the sacrifice inherent in the restriction of the right to liberty is not exaggerated or excessive compared to the advantages obtained by such restriction and the achievement of the purpose sought.”125 99. With respect to the first point, the Court has indicated that the measure should only be imposed when it is necessary to satisfy a legitimate purpose; in other words, that the accused cannot obstruct the proceedings nor evade the action of justice.126 The Court has also stressed that the procedural danger cannot be presumed, but rather there must be a verification based on the objective and factual circumstances of the danger in each case.127 These requirements are drawn from Articles 7(3), 7(5) and 8(2) of the Convention. 100. Article 7(5) establishes that “[a]ny person detained shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to be released without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings. His release may be subject to guarantees to assure his appearance for trial.” Thus, the measures that restrict liberty in the context of criminal proceedings are subject to the Convention; they have a precautionary purpose in that they are a means to neutralize procedural risks, and the norm refers especially to appearance for trial. 101. For its part, Article 8(2) sets forth the principle of the presumption of innocence, according to which a person is innocent until he or she is found guilty. This guarantee ensures that the elements that show the existence of a legitimate purpose are not based on a presumption, but rather the judge must decide on the objective and factual circumstances of the specific case,128 which is the responsibility of the prosecutor and not the accused,129 who must be afforded the possibility of the right to an adversarial procedure and to be duly aided Cf. Case of Tibi v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 7, 2004. Series C No. 114, para. 106 and Case of Amrhein et al. v. Costa Rica, para. 353. 122 123 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, para. 103. Cf. Case of López Álvarez v. Honduras, para. 67 and Case of Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 17, 2009. Series C No. 206, para. 121. 124 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, para. 92 and Case of Amrhein et al. v. Costa Rica, para. 356. 125 Cf. Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador. Merits. Judgment of November 12, 1997. Series C No. 35, para. 77 and Case of Amrhein et al. v. Costa Rica, para. 356. 126 127 Cf. Case of Amrhein et al. v. Costa Rica, para. 357 and Case of Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela, para. 115. 128 Cf. Case of Amrhein et al. v. Costa Rica, para. 357. 129 Cf. ECHR. Case of Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, Judgment of July 26, 2001, Application N° 33977/96, para. 85. 20