her release must be decreed whenever it appears that the pre-trial detention does not satisfy those conditions, even though the respective proceedings continue. Moreover, it should be recalled that it is the national authorities who are charged with evaluating whether it is appropriate to maintain the precautionary measures that are issued under their legal norms. In so doing, the national authorities must offer sufficient reasons for maintaining the restriction that, so that it not become an arbitrary deprivation of liberty under Article 7(3), must be based on the need to ensure that the detainee will not obstruct the adequate development of the investigations nor evade the action of justice. Similarly, before every request for the release of the detainee, the judge must at least minimally substantiate (Article 8(1)) the reasons for maintaining the pre-trial detention. Notwithstanding the above, even when there are reasons to maintain a person in pre-trial detention, the period of the deprivation of liberty must not exceed a reasonable time, as established in Article 7(5) of the Convention.145 b) Analysis of the pre-trial detention in this case 112. In evaluating the circumstances of this case, it must be determined whether the arguments of the judge, in extending the pre-trial detention, to justify the risk of flight as a reason for the pre-trial detention violated Articles 7(3), 7(5) and 8(2) of the Convention. 113. In his decision of August 1, 2001, the Examining Magistrate considered the following elements: […] it may be cautiously inferred that the eventual sentence to be applied, under the rules for conjoint offenses, would be more than five years, which would be the minimum sentence with a possible maximum sentence of 25 years, which results in the following conclusion: that such a forecast of his sentence is exclusively taken into account as one aspect of the requirements relating to the reasonableness of the pre-trial detention, which is an evaluation of flight risk […], and although not solely sufficient to assume that it will occur, it is enough when other circumstances concur, such as the imminence of a trial and the utterances of the accused himself in the sense of not subjecting himself to the judicial authorities charged with adjudging his situation, utterances of June 27 of this year, when giving his statement before this court […]. Those categorical utterances of the accused and the possible severity of the sentence lead to the presumption that, if released, he will not appear for trial, frustrating the action of justice and obstructing, therefore, the crystallization of the substantive law.146 114. The Court observes that one of the reasons for the extension of the measure was, in general terms, the risk of flight. This is a reason, as has been stated, that is permitted by the Convention. The Court, however, pays special attention to the criteria used to justify the existence of objective elements that would permit a reasonable inference that a flight might occur. Although the Court, as the State pointed out in its briefs, does not exercise functions of a fourth instance of judicial review nor does it examine the assessment of the evidence by the national judges, it does have the authority, under exceptional circumstances, to decide on the content of judicial decisions that contravene, in a manifestly arbitrary manner, the 145 Cf. Case of Argüelles et al. v. Argentina, paras. 121 and 122. Mr. Romero Feris in his statement at the preliminary investigation declared “[...] that he was not going to appear to make such a statement and that he refuses to make the statement of the accused before [M.P.] since he considered that the latter was not a natural judge to intervene in this case nor in any case in which he was accused [...] therefore, he considers it legitimate not to make such a statement in the case until it can be made before an impartial and natural judge. The same situation occurs in the Second Chamber, which acts as an appeals court in this case and the others in which he is accused.” Mr. Romero Feris stated on another occasion that “he signed only to confirm that [M.P.] is not a natural judge, who is not a judge according to the Constitution and who permanently showed, as did the Prosecutor, a repeated animosity and a fallacious attitude. He ratified that he would not recognize it in any way nor under any circumstances and that he would no longer give any statement for any reason, nor to the Second Chamber, which has also fallen into the same errors and for which he has the same opinion.” Cf. First Examining Magistrate, Resolution N° 1251 of August 1, 2001 (evidence file, f. 187. 146 23