unconstitutionality. Finally, we should state that any decision of the [STJC] on competence assigned to this court should be material for a recourse before a higher jurisdiction, which is the Federal Court. […] I do not see how an Examining Magistrate, such as I, can reexamine a decision of the Superior Court that, to make matters worse, concerns the magistrate himself, if the ruling on competence was not the purpose of the recourse before the Federal Court based on the guarantee of a Natural Judge […].”158 143. With respect to the second recourse, on May 24, 2001 the alleged victim filed an exception of lack of jurisdiction and competence. He sought to challenge the “universal jurisdiction” assigned to the judge in his cases by a STJC decision and the manner in which the judge was appointed by the Senate of the Province. This was rejected as judge held, with respect to the jurisdictional norms, that it “is beyond the competence of the undersigned to reexamine a decision of the Superior Court” and with respect to his legitimacy as a judge, he does not possess the authority as an Examining Magistrate to rule on such a matter.159 144. On June 7, 2001, the defense counsel filed a remedy of appeal on the decision that contained the same arguments. The Second Chamber rejected the recourse and confirmed the resolution of the magistrate. It analyzed each of the six issues presented by the defense counsel and agreed that the magistrate had acted within the context ordered by the STJC, in exercise of its functions of oversight that are exclusively inherent to it under Articles 24(2) and 31 of Decree Law N° 26/00.160 145. Finally, on July 18, 2001, the defense counsel filed a writ of cassation before the Second Chamber, which declared it inadmissible because “the appealed decision does not specifically deal with the purpose of the filed recourse.”161 146. After a review of the procedural actions that led to the declaration of nullity, the Court notes that the strategy of the alleged victim with respect to those recourses consisted mainly in alleging the nullity of the acts of the Examining Magistrate because of the manner in which he was appointed and because of the administrative decision to consolidate the cases. There is no record of a filing of recusal or any recourse of unconstitutionality regarding the lack of impartiality of that magistrate, recourses that would normally be used to present challenges related to this issue. Regarding those arguments, note is taken that the domestic courts rejected those recourses holding that, among other reasons, they lacked competence to rule on them. Nor did the representative present arguments or evidence that could be used to determine the appropriateness of the recourses to challenge the impartiality or the manner of appointing the Examining Magistrate. Therefore, in view of the evidence available to the Court, it is not clear whether the alleged victim filed the appropriate recourses to challenge the manner of appointing the Examining Magistrate. 147. The Court also observes, in view of the obligations established in Article 25 of the Convention, that the decisions of the judge and of the Chamber on the recourses, as well as in the other cases where they were reiterated, responded to each of the questions raised by the defense counsel and were rejected with reasoned opinions and were based on the domestic norms. It should be repeated that the effectiveness of a recourse is not dependent on a response favorable to those who filed it, but rather to the adequacy of the judicial decision that resolved it to remedy and redress the alleged situation in the event that a violation is proven (supra para. 135). 148. With respect to the Commission’s arguments that the decisions do not indicate the recourse or recourses that the defense counsel should have presented to question the 158 Cf. First Court of Instruction, Order N° 1267 of September 26, 2000 (evidence file, fs. 254 to 255). 159 Cf. First Court of Instruction, Order N° 989 of June 4, 2001 (evidence file, f. 297). 160 Cf. Second Criminal Chamber, Resolution N° 276 of June 20, 2001 (evidence file, f. 306). 161 Cf. Second Criminal Chamber, Resolution N° 314 of July 20, 2001 (evidence file, f. 334). 29