28 demands the compliance and accurate exercise of requirements or demands that are already enshrined in Article 21(2) of the Convention,” namely: “payment of a just compensation, for reasons of public interest or social interest and in the cases and according to the terms established by law,” which were analyzed in the Judgment on the Merits. 76. Regarding the just compensation, the Court established in its Judgment of May 6, 2008, that, in cases of expropriation, besides considering the market value of the property object of the expropriation prior to the declaration of public interest as an element of reference, “it must seek to achieve a just balance between the public interest and the private interest.”125 Thus, the Court referred that “in order for the State to be able to legitimately satisfy a social interest and find [said] just balance […,] it must use proportional means in order to reduce the violation to the right to property of the person object of the restriction as much as possible.”126 In order to achieve this, it is necessary to note the “just demands” of a “democratic society,” assess the different interests at play, and the need to preserve the object and purpose of the Convention.”127 All this will be factored when determining the value of the property as just compensation, especially regarding properties that have an environmental nature. 77. In this regard, the Tribunal recalls that in its Judgment on the Merits, it mentioned that the deprivation of the right to property by the State was based on reasons of public interest and social interest, and it highlighted that “a legitimate or public interest based on the protection of the environment, as observed in the present case, represents a legitimate claim regarding public interest.”128 However, the State “did not respect the requirements necessary to restrict the right to property gathered in the general principles of international law and explicitly stated in the American Convention.”129 Likewise, “the State failed to comply with the forms established in the law upon violating judicial protection and guarantees, since the remedies sought have exceeded the reasonable time provided for their resolution and have not been effective. The aforementioned has indefinitely deprived the victim of her property, as well as of the payment of a just compensation, which has caused both great legal and factual uncertainty, thereby causing excessive burdens, turning said expropriation into an arbitrary one.”130 Therefore, the Court declared the State responsible of the violation of Articles 21(2) of the Convention, in relation with the rights established in Articles 8(1) and 25(1) of said treaty, to the detriment of the victim. 78. Additionally, the Court observes that according to the evidence presented, the property has belonged to the family of María Salvador Chiriboga since 1935 and to her, as owner, as of 1967.131 Additionally, Mrs. Salvador Chiriboga in her statement rendered before this Court, stated that the property had been acquired by her father Guillermo Salvador Chiriboga with “much sacrifice and much debt,” with the objective of “inheriting it to his grandchildren.” Her father also “gave [the Municipality] the Bernal Casa Plaza” and sold other plots at “very insignificant prices” to people with limited resources. Additionally, it has been proven that, 125 Case of Salvador Chiriboga V. Ecuador, supra note 24, para. 98 126 Case of Salvador Chiriboga V. Ecuador, supra note 24, para. 63. 127 Cf. Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of November 13, 1985. Series A No. 5, para. 67; The Word “Laws” in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights. Advisory Opinion OC-6/86 of May 9, 1986. Series A No. 6, para. 31, and Case of Salvador Chiriboga V. Ecuador, supra note 24, para.75. 128 129 130 Case of Salvador Chiriboga V. Ecuador, supra note 24, para. 76.. Case of Salvador Chiriboga V. Ecuador, supra note 24, para. 116. Case of Salvador Chiriboga V. Ecuador, supra note 24, para. .117. 131 The property was acquired by Guillermo Salvador Chiriboga Tobar and Elvira Chiriboga on December 6, 1935. On September 6, 1977, effective possession was granted to the property left by Elvira Chiriboga, widow of Salvador, Maria Salvador Chiriboga without prejudice to the rights of third parties, and other references in the interdiction of Mr. Guillermo Salvador Chiriboga. Cf. Expert assessment of Vicente Domínguez Zambrano, supra note 26, folio 3960).