Martínez’s detention, despite noting errors and irregularities in his period of imprisonment and without an order from a criminal judge. Thus, between January 17 and 29, 2008, the State kept the alleged victim in detention without a written or oral order from a criminal judge. 349. The State argued that on February 19, 1999, a precautionary measure was applied to Mr. Martínez as an alternative to pretrial detention, releasing him by means of: a) a sum of money as a guarantee that he would not evade justice, b) an impediment to leave the country without an expiration date, and c) an order to sign in every 15 days. It pointed out that this precautionary measure was issued to Mr. Martinez on February 22, 1999; however, the accused left Costa Rica on November 26, 1999, with said measure in force, and was a fugitive for 4 years and 7 days, until he returned after being extradited. It added that the Canadian State rejected the existence of any situation that would justify granting him political asylum and, instead, extradited him by virtue of the international arrest warrant issued against him. Similarly, taking into account the complexity of the criminal case, the application of the complex procedure of the Costa Rican criminal system was justified. According to the State, based on Article 329 of the CCP, the trial court may extend the pretrial detention to ensure the holding of the oral and public trial, in which case the time restrictions of Articles 258 and 376 to 379 of said Code do not apply. In this regard, given that the only purpose of the extension in question was to ensure the holding of the trial, preventive detention was a reasonable and proportional measure in view of the proven danger of flight, the danger of obstructing the proceedings - inasmuch as his participation in the destruction of evidence was proven- and his necessary presence during the oral and public trial. Moreover, the deprivation of liberty was always subject to periodic review by the judicial authorities. Finally, the State pointed out that after being convicted, Mr. Martínez was held in pretrial detention for 11 days between January 17 and 29, 2008- without any resolution due to a material error in the indication of the dates in the corresponding document. The Constitutional Chamber recognized the violation of the right to personal liberty and ordered the State to pay damages; however, it did not order his immediate release because there was a lawful ruling that applied pretrial detention from January 29, 2008 (once the error was noticed, a new ruling was issued). B. Considerations of the Court 350. In the instant case, the dispute consists of determining whether the pretrial detention of Mr. Martínez during the processing of his criminal case was unlawful, arbitrary or unreasonable, taking into account the applicable norms, as well as the grounds and reasons of the judicial authorities for extending the precautionary measure beyond the ordinary period. The Court will first analyze Articles 7(1), 7(2), 7(3) and 7(5) of the Convention and, separately, Article 7(6). 351. This Court recalls that Article 7 of the Convention contains two distinct types of rules: one general, the other specific. The general rule is established in the first subparagraph: “[e]very person has the right to personal liberty and security;” the specific rule consists of a series of guarantees that protect a person’s right not to be deprived of liberty unlawfully (Art. 7(2)) or in an arbitrary manner (Art. 7(3)), to be informed of the reasons for his detention and the charges against him (Art. 7(4)), to judicial control of the deprivation of liberty and the reasonable length of time in custody (Art. 7(5)), to contest the lawfulness of the arrest (Art. 7(6)), and not to be detained for debt (Art. 7(7)). 487 487 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Iñiguez v. Ecuador, supra, para. 51, and Case of Yarce et al. v. Colombia. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 22, 2016. Series C No. 325, para. 138. 113