cases on the basis of a superficial and simplistic analysis based solely on the right to appeal the judgment, set aside broader considerations of the respective proceedings and the in-depth analysis of the existing effective procedural mechanisms. 73 b) In most of the eight petitions that gave rise to the instant case, as time went by and even after the issuance of the Admissibility Report, the alleged victims added more allegations, arguments and alleged facts. This made it difficult for the State to use the relevant procedural mechanisms, including the impossibility of using preliminary objections when the subject matter of the litigation had already been defined in the Admissibility Report, but was constantly being expanded by the petitioners. c) The Commission’s weak analysis of the alleged violations in each of the criminal proceedings, specifically, in the cassation appeals, is extremely worrying. This is due to the fact that it is not possible to substantiate violations of due process and the right to appeal the judgment solely on the basis of a reading of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1996 and without analyzing each case individually, even though the State pointed out that the cassation appeal cannot be separated from the jurisprudential development of the Constitutional Chamber and the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, which, in accordance with control of conventionality, has modified and even disregarded the norms that the Commission mentioned in its Admissibility and Merits Reports. d) The Commission did not properly analyze the preliminary objections filed during the admissibility phase. In this regard, it failed to conduct a thorough analysis of the review mechanism for specific cases as an adequate and effective remedy, which in the procedural codes of 1973, 1996, 2006 and 2010 served as another remedy at the domestic level, with clear characteristics of being adequate and effective for a comprehensive review of the judgment. It automatically excluded its validity and then applied the exception provided by the Convention to invalidate the argument of failure to exhaust domestic remedies. In this sense, and due to the fact that it did not conduct a precise, profound, objective and serious analysis, the Commission dismissed ad portas the measures adopted by the State to provide greater guarantees. Thus, in the Admissibility Report it made an advance judgment in relation to Law 8837, before it had even entered into force, rejecting the special review procedure that it established for cases such as those of the alleged victims. e) On several occasions in the Merits Report, the Commission reached conclusions that were clearly unreasonable and superficial. Likewise, in several paragraphs of the Merits Report, false, incorrect, incomplete or inaccurate information was included. 74 73 During the public hearing on preliminary objections, the State emphasized that it did not question the Commission’s power to join petitions and cases, but rather requested that the Commission exercise that right responsibly respecting due process, the State’s right of defense and the procedural balance between the parties. It argued that to join the cases it is necessary to provide reasons as to why the joinder is necessary in application of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure. 74 To support this argument, the State referred in detail to specific aspects of Merits Report, inter alia, it held that: i) there was a lack of a detailed analysis of the right to appeal the judgment, since it was sufficient to indicate that “the alleged victims began the appeals stage with a regulatory restriction of the arguments that they could present”, to conclude the violation in general; ii) it concluded, without proper analysis, that “the denial of the conversion [of a petition for a writ of reversal on cassation filed by Rafael Rojas to one of appeal] for not having specified how Article 8(2)(h) was violated” is in breach of the right to full analysis; iii) it did not differentiate between the system that covered the criminal case against Manfred Amrhein Pinto and others based on the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973, and the one applied to the other groups of alleged victims whose cases were based on the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1996. Furthermore, there seems to be an interest in making people think that the Case of Manfred Amrhein and others was limited to the 1996 Code, when this was not the case; and iv) to conclude that the cassation appeal of Law 8503 excluded the possible assessment of the facts, the judgment 2008-00232 Third Chamber of Jorge Martinez was cited, which referred to the impossibility of reviewing the facts 24