9 States Parties to the Convention when they signed it and, ultimately, how that conventional expression should be understood when faced with new situations. In this order of ideas, it is important to recall that judgments and advisory opinions must, on the one hand, indicate only what is actually stipulated in the Convention including, of course, the pro personae principle,50 and not what one might wish to find stipulated, and on the other hand, they must avoid modifying them. 20. Thus, for the foregoing reasons the Court’s judgments and advisory opinions must refer, as they claim to do51 and 52, to the provisions concerning the interpretation of treaties established in the Vienna Convention.53 21. These provisions include three approaches to interpretation. One is the textual or literal method that focuses on analyzing the text of the treaty, the vocabulary used and the ordinary meaning of its terms. Another is the subjective method, which tries to ascertain the will of the parties to the treaty and, to that end, also analyzes the preparatory work and subsequent conduct of the parties. The third approach is the functional or teleological method, which aims to determine the purpose or function of the treaty in order to fulfill its object and purpose. 22. These three methods incorporate four rules, namely, good faith, the terms, their context and the object and purpose pursued, which must be applied simultaneously and harmoniously, without omitting any of these elements, or favoring one over another. Article 29: “Restrictions Regarding Interpretation. No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as: a) permitting any State Party, group, or person to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in this Convention or to restrict them to a greater extent than is provided for herein; b) restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by virtue of the laws of any State Party or by virtue of another convention to which one of the said states is a party; c) precluding other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the human personality or derived from representative democracy as a form of government; or d) excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and other international acts of the same nature may have. 50 51 Paragraph 36 of the Judgment. Hereinafter, whenever reference is made to “para.” or “paras.” it shall be understood to mean the relevant paragraph or paragraphs, of the Judgment. 52 Article 31. “General rule of interpretation. I. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty: b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty; 3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions: b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation: c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended. Article 32. “Supplementary means of interpretation. Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31: a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” 53