18 44. It is also useful to recall that the literal interpretation method does not imply attributing the ordinary meaning to a “provision,” as the Ruling does,101 but rather to “terms,”102 or “words,”103 something that is confirmed if we bear in mind the provision of the Vienna Convention that states, “a special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.” 104 45. To all the aforementioned points, we should add that the Ruling does not ponder the fact that the Convention utilizes, as mentioned previously,105 the terms “recognized,” “rights established,” “guaranteed,” “enshrined” or “protected” by or in the Convention, and that it also alludes to other rights, namely, “economic, social and cultural rights,” that are “derived” from the standards of the OAS Charter; those “recognized” by the laws of the States or other conventions and those “inherent to the human being or that derive from a democratic representative form of government.”106 46. In other words, it is important to note that the Ruling not only does not consider all the terms transcribed in the “ordinary meaning to be given to [them]”, but also omits to refer to them. In other words, it rules as though they were not used by the Convention. 47. In view of the foregoing, we can argue that on this particular matter, and despite affirming to the contrary, the Ruling does not follow the literal or textual approach or, therefore, the rule of treaty interpretation concerning the terms; instead, it ultimately gives precedence to the functional or teleological method over the literal or textual method of treaty interpretation and, of course, this leads to an erroneous interpretation of Article 26 of the Convention. B. Internal context – systematic interpretation 48. In relation to the so-called “Internal context -systematic interpretation” in the Ruling (in the case of Cuscúl Pivaral et al.), this really appears to refer to the subjective method of treaty interpretation, contemplated in Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention. 49. In fact, the Ruling states that “the general obligations “to respect” and “to guarantee” rights, together with the obligation relating to “domestic legal effects” of Article 2 of the Convention, apply to all rights, whether civil and political, or economic, social, cultural and environmental” 107 and consequently, “since States have an obligation to respect and guarantee the rights indicated in Article 26, in the terms of Article 1(1) of the Convention, the Court is competent to assess whether there 101 Para. 79 of the Ruling. [Case of Cuscúl Pivaral] 102 Footnote 53. 103 Diccionario de la Lengua Española, 2018. 104 Footnote 53. 105 Para. 33, d). 106 107 Idem. Para. 83 of the Ruling. [Case of Cuscúl Pivaral]