23 IV. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 68. In addition to the foregoing, there are other affirmations, either in the Judgment (case of Muelle Flores) or in the Ruling (Cuscúl Pivaral), which I do not share and regarding which I consider it appropriate to highlight the reasons for my disagreement. 69. The affirmation in the Ruling,128 and reiterated in the Judgment, that the conclusion reached “is based not only on formal issues, but results from the interdependence and indivisibility of civil and political rights and economic, social, cultural and environmental rights, as well as their compatibility with the object and purpose of the Convention,”129 does not necessarily imply that the violation of both types of rights can be invoked before the Court. The position expressed in the Judgment could be shared on the understanding that although the enjoyment of all human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights, must be respected, and that consequently all may be enforceable by the competent authorities, this does not necessarily or exclusively mean that the latter are, always, in every circumstance and in relation to all human rights, to be brought before an international tribunal and, eventually, before the Court, especially when we consider that the interAmerican jurisdiction reinforces or complements that established in the domestic laws of the State concerned.130 Indeed, here we are not disputing the fact that alleged violations of any human right can and should be claimed before the competent domestic courts;131 my argument is that only some violations of the economic, social and cultural rights may be submitted to the Court for consideration and a ruling, which does not include the right to social security. 70. The second reason for my dissent, on which I consider it necessary to insist, is that in order to claim the right to social security before the Court, it would be indispensable for this to be permitted by a new conventional rule. In fact, Articles 31, 76(1) and 77(1) of the Convention,132 expressly 128 Para. 85 of the Ruling [Case of Cuscúl Pivaral] 129 Para. 36 of the Judgment. 130 Footnote 44. Article 46: “1. Admission by the Commission of a petition or communication lodged in accordance with Articles 44 or 45 shall be subject to the following requirements: a) that the remedies under domestic law have been pursued and exhausted in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law; b) that the petition or communication is lodged within a period of six months from the date on which the party alleging violation of his rights was notified of the final judgment; c) that the subject of the petition or communication is not pending in another international proceeding for settlement; and d) that, in the case of Article 44, the petition contains the name, nationality, profession, domicile, and signature of the person or persons or of the legal representative of the entity lodging the petition. 2. The provisions of paragraphs 1(a) and 1(b) of this article shall not be applicable when: a) the domestic legislation of the state concerned does not afford due process of law for the protection of the right or rights that have allegedly been violated; b) the party alleging violation of his rights has been denied access to the remedies under domestic law or has been prevented from exhausting them; or c) there has been unwarranted delay in rendering a final judgment under the aforementioned remedies.” Article 61:” 1. Only the States Parties and the Commission shall have the right to submit a case to the Court. 2. In order for the Court to hear a case, it is necessary that the procedures set forth in Articles 48 and 50 shall have been completed.” 131 132 Footnote 16.