15 6. The basic reason for the reference to all the documents cited above 69 seems to have been to support the interpretation as regards the existence of the right to work and the right to job security, which, we repeat, is not contradicted or opposed in this opinion. However, this does not mean that the said texts establish that the violation of those rights can be submitted to the consideration and decision of the Court pursuant to the oft cited Article 26. 7. The phrase that “the Court exercises full jurisdiction over all its articles and provisions”;70 similarly, no matter that Article 26 of the Convention includes rights whose violation can be submitted to the consideration of the Court for a decision, it also indicates that the Court should rule applying and interpreting the provisions of the Convention, 71 which it should do – as stated previously – respecting the public law principle that only what the law allows or prescribes is admissible. 8. Regarding the phrase that “the Court has the authority to decide any dispute concerning its jurisdiction,”72 it should be recalled that the instant case did not refer to the presumed violation of labor rights in light of the Convention. It was only the petitioner who did this, and only before the Commission;73 moreover, without invoking the application of Article 26. Thus, strictly speaking there was no dispute in this regard. 9. The mention of “important case law on this matter, in light of different articles of the Convention”74 should also be understood as the use of the Court’s own case law as a supplementary source of international law and not as the creation, per se, of international obligations or rights. 10. Lastly, the statement that “the right to work is explicitly recognized in different domestic laws of the States in the region”75 only supposes that there is no doubt that in the domestic sphere or at the national level, the presumed violation of the right to work can and should be invoked before the competent domestic courts, and not that there is a right to claim the violation of that right before the Inter-American Court pursuant to Article 26 of the Convention. CONCLUSION In sum, I disagree with the decision in the judgment because, since the Convention makes a clear distinction between political and civil rights and economic, social and cultural rights, the right to work, including the right to job security, as part of the latter rights is not a right “recognized” in the Convention and, consequently, is not safeguarded by the system of protection that is established therein only for the political and civil rights. For the economic, social and cultural rights to be judicialized before the Court, the signature of an additional protocol would be necessary, and this has not happened, except partially with the Protocol of San Salvador, but for matters other than those in the instant case. I also dissent because Article 26 of the Convention establishes obligations of conduct for the States, and not a recognition of human rights. Moreover, this provisions cites the OAS Charter, which, in turn, does not recognize human rights, but rather stipulates “goals” or “principles and mechanisms” that the States undertake to achieve or to implement, as applicable. In addition, I 69 Paras. 143 to 149. 70 Para. 142. 71 Art. 62(3) cit. 72 Para. 142. 73 Paras. 133 to 137. 74 Para. 154. 75 Para. 145.