PARTIALLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE HUMBERTO ANTONIO SIERRA PORTO JUDGMENT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS CASE OF LAGOS DEL CAMPO v. PERU JUDGMENT OF AUGUST 31, 2017 (Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs) With the usual respect for the decision of the Court, allow me to submit the following partially dissenting opinion in the above case, which will be presented in the following order: A. INTRODUCTION 1. The intention of this partially dissenting opinion is to present, in detail, the reasons why I voted against the fifth operative paragraph of the judgment in the Case of Lagos del Campo v. Peru. My position with regard to making the so-called economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) justiciable by a direct application of Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) is already known, in light of the fact that two years ago I submitted a concurring opinion on this matter in the Case of González Lluy et al. v. Ecuador. On that occasion, I indicated the legal arguments that substantiated my position in the hope that they would become part of the internal and external debate on the applicability of the said article of the Convention, but also in order to dissuade those who advocated for the step that the Inter-American Court has taken in this judgment. 2. This does not mean that, in general, I am contrary to the thesis that the ESCR are justiciable rights. To the contrary, during my time as a member of the Colombian Constitutional Court I had occasion to contribute to the development of case law on the nature of fundamental rights and, therefore, their enforceability by means of the action for the protection of the right to health, the right to decent housing, the right to potable water, and the right to social security, among others. However, I consider that there are substantial differences between, on the one hand, the Colombian Constitution and the American Convention and, on the other, between the role of a judge of a constitutional court and the role of a judge who is a member of an international human rights court. 3. In addition, my experience as a judge of a national court whose track record in the direct justiciability of the ESCR is widely known has left me with the clear perception of the difficulties faced by a judicial organ that assumes jurisdiction in this area. This is because, even though the protection of these rights does not always involve the adoption of public policies or decisionmaking in relation to scarce resources or merit goods, in numerous cases submitted to the consideration of a judicial authority, that is what is required and this inevitably leads to discussion on the role of judges under a social rule of law and the legitimate organ for the adoption of such decisions under a democratic system. 4. In this regard, I remain convinced that, within the framework of the inter-American system for the protection of human rights, the justiciability of the ESCR should not be implemented by the direct application of Article 26 of the ACHR, as in this case and I will indicate the grounds for my position below. Thus, in this opinion: (i) I will reiterate the general reasons why I do not agree with the justiciability of the ESCR based on Article 26 described in my previous concurring opinion, and I will add the concerns that this judgment has caused me in this regard; (ii) I will indicated