6 did not allow this debate to be undertaken and, in particular, to arrive at the conclusion reached by the majority of the Inter-American Court. 27. First, I consider it extremely rash to use the iura novit curia principle in this case. As is well known, the Inter-American Court has used this principle since its very first judgments, 15 and has defined it as “the authority and even the duty [of the judge] to apply the pertinent legal provisions in a case, even when the parties do not expressly invoke them.”16 Thus, this principle means, as its name indicates, that the inter-America judge can apply a norm that has not been alleged by the Commission or the parties, because it is better positioned to determine which right is applicable to the case. In other words, the inter-American system is not justice based on the content of the petition (justicia rogada), in the sense that the litigation is not undertaken based on the norms alleged by the Commission or the parties. 28. Therefore, I consider that, even though this is an acknowledged faculty of inter-American judges, it cannot be used under any circumstance and without having recourse to certain criteria of reasonableness and pertinence. Indeed, I consider that the said principle may be used when a human rights violation is evident or when the representatives or the Commission have committed a serious omission or error, so that the Court rectifies a possible injustice, but this principle should not be used to surprise a State with a violation that it had no way of anticipating and that it was unable to contest, not even at the time of the facts. 29. In this case, the judgment indicates that, during the first stage of the process before the Inter-American Commission, the petitioner argued the presumed violation of the right to work. 17 This was taken as grounds to conclude that the State had been aware of the facts from the start 18 and that “the parties […] had abundant possibilities of referring to the scope of the rights involved in the facts analyzed.”19 30. It may be considered that the Court reached its conclusion in a perfunctory and over hasty manner, because indicating that the State had abundant possibility to defend itself based on the violation of Article 26 of the American Convention, does not take into account the strenuous debate on this article that has taken place within the Inter-American Court. Indeed, by declaring the violation of Article 26 of the ACHR in this case, the Court was not simply considering whether or not the dismissal of Mr. Lagos was justified; rather, behind this, there have been long discussions on the scope of an article, which have not always been calm and which the States have been emphatic in rejecting. Thus, it is not sufficient to say that a mention in the allegations presented prior to the Commission’s Admissibility Report could allow the State of Peru to anticipate that it was possible that the Inter-American Court would declare the violation of this right in a case that was submitted as a presumed violation of Articles 8 and 13 of the ACHR. 31. In this regard, I consider that in light of the complexities of the debate on Article 26 of the ACHR and the implications that this can have not only on this case in particular, but also as a future precedent for the Inter-American Court, the least that could be asked is that an open and public debate should be allowed on the possible interpretations and scope being discussed. Indeed, if this conclusion had been reached in a case such as Gonzalez Lluy v. Ecuador, in which the debate took place between the representatives and the State during the public hearing and 15 166. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Merits), Series C No. 4, paras. 163 to Case of Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, Judgment of June 21, 2002 (Merits, reparations and costs), para. 107. 16 17 Judgment Lagos del Campo v. Peru, paras. 133 to 139. It should be stressed that the judgment indicates that the Peruvian State was aware of the facts, but when this is mentioned in footnote No. 183, it includes a citation that that refers to an argument on a right to work and not to a specific fact. 18 19 Judgment Lagos del Campo v. Peru, para. 137.