8 in case law because, basically, what this judgment does is modify the American Convention and, thereby, fundamentally transforms the system of inter-American justice. 38. In relation to the second point, the judgment not only fails to recognize that it was making a change in case law, but also seeks to make the reader believe that what it is doing is a repetition of its case law. In this regard, starting in paragraph 141 of the judgment, the Court begins to affirm that it is reiterating its case law in cases such as Acevedo Buendía, which, as is well-known, is not a case in which the Court reached the conclusion that Article 26 of the ACHR had been violated. 39. Regarding the case of Acevedo Buendía et al. v. Peru, I repeat that, in my opinion, the scope that the Court has tried to give to this judgment is excessive. First, in that judgment, the Court did not declare the violation of Article 26 and the analysis made was precisely with regard to the obligation of progressive development, and not the direct enforceability of any right in particular. Second, that judgment did not define or clarify which ESCR it was protecting, or its scope or minimum content. Third, even if the Court wished to derive some type of direct justiciability from the assertion that the obligations to respect and to ensure rights are applicable to Article 26 of the Convention, it should be stressed that such assertions were an obiter dictum of that judgment, because they had no direct relationship to the final decision which was not to declare a violation of Article 26.20 In addition, this element of the judgment has not been reiterated in the Court’s subsequent case law up until this case, so that it could not be considered a reiterated precedent. b) Use of a single method of interpretation to reach the decision 40. That said, the second flaw in the arguments centers upon the use of a single interpretation method to interpret the treaty. As mentioned previously in this opinion, the exclusive use of “evolutive interpretation” disregards the fact that to make an interpretation that is in keeping with the treaty and that is not arbitrary, all the methods of interpretation described in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention should be applied simultaneously. Thus, this simple omission, that moves away from the type of analysis that the Inter-American Court usually makes when it is faced with the need to interpret the American Convention is, in itself, an inexcusable error. 41. In addition, and with regard to the definition of evolutive interpretation, the InterAmerican Court has indicated on various occasions21 that human rights treaties are living instruments the interpretation of which must evolve with the passage of time and contemporary conditions. It has also asserted that this evolutive interpretation is consequent with the general rules of interpretation established in Article 29 of the American Convention, and in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.22 In this regard, “evolutive interpretation” may be understood as the determination and construction of the meaning of the norms derived from treaty-based precepts that, originally, were not in the intention of the countries that took part in drafting them, but which, today, owing to changes in the social and political reality, have become very relevant. Indeed, the reason why the judgment decides that there is no violation is that, “considering that the analysis is not centered on some measure adopted by the State that hindered the progressive realization of the right to a pension, but on the State's non-compliance with the payment ordered by the domestic courts, the Court deems that the violated rights are those protected in Articles 25 and 21 of the Convention and does not find grounds to also declare noncompliance with Article 26 of this instrument.” Case of Acevedo Buendía et al. (“Discharged and Retired Employees of the Office of the Comptroller”) v. Peru, para. 106. 20 Cf. Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, para. 114; Case of Atala Riffo and daughters v. Chile. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 24, 2012. Series C No. 239, para. 83; Case of Artavia Murillo et al. (In vitro fertilization) v. Costa Rica, para. 245, and Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, para. 55. Similarly, the Preamble of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man indicates that: “[t]he international protection of the rights of man should be the principal guide of an evolving American law.” 21 22 Cf. Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, para. 114, and Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, para. 55.