9 The original text of treaties was not drafted taking into account facts and circumstances that, nowadays, fall within treaty-based circumstances. 42. Accordingly, this method of interpretation plays an important role, which is to update the treaty-based standards to the needs of the new times. Despite this, another of the flaws in the judgment lies in the use of “evolutive interpretation” to camouflage a “treaty modification.” This type of modification involves a substantial change in the text of the American Convention, by “interpretations” that are contrary to the wording of the Convention’s text. Thus, with the pretext of interpreting the Convention, a situation is created that is contrary to the text or to an interpretation in keeping with this instrument. Treaty modification obeys the same logic as the mechanism that constitutional doctrine calls constitutional mutation.23 43. In this regard, it has already been established that when all interpretation methods are used, the conclusion is reached that an extensive interpretation of Article 26 of the American Convention cannot derogate what the States sovereignly decided when they signed and ratified the Protocol of San Salvador. Thus, I can affirm without fear of contradiction that, in this judgment, the Court did not make an evolutive interpretation, because evolution cannot lead the Court to contravene the Convention. It is one thing to decide innovative matters that were not anticipated by the creators of the norm, and quite another to change the norm. c) Confusion between the existence of the right and the Inter-American Court’s jurisdiction 44. Third, the judgment does not address the problem of jurisdiction, because it focuses its arguments on proving the existence of the right to work or to job security, but makes no mention of Article 19 of the Protocol of San Salvador. The only mention of jurisdiction is made at the end of the analysis of the arguments in paragraph 154 of the judgment in which, once again, the Court tries to say that the discussion concerning the its jurisdiction had already been settled in the case of Acevedo Buendía when, as explained above, this assertion is not true. 45. In my opinion, this confusion is based on the clear desire to rectify, at any cost, what “some” consider an error in the Protocol of San Salvador when it limits the justiciability of the ESCR established therein. In this understanding, I consider that it is necessary to make a distinction between the advantages derived from the justiciability of the ESCR and the legal determination of the Court’s jurisdiction in this area. 46. As I have stated on other occasions, the Inter-American Court has already taken indirect decisions with regard to ESCR, generally by using connectivity, which is a less polemic methodology and, above all, more respectful of the intention of the States expressed in the American Convention and in its Protocol. It should not be overlooked that any action above and beyond the American Convention will be arbitrary even when it is based on good intentions. E. GENERAL CONCLUSION 47. In general, I consider that a judgment that declares the international responsibility of a State cannot include flaws in its arguments of the magnitude described above. If the Court wishes to hold the domestic courts to such a high standard as that established in this judgment with regard to providing the reasons for their decisions, the minimum that can be required is that it use the same yardstick for its own decision because, to the contrary, it runs the risk of adversely affecting the legitimacy of the Inter-American Court vis-à-vis our colleagues in the jurisdictional task. In this regard, constitutional mutation refers to “the transformation or modification of a constitutional principle or precept.” Humberto Sierra Porto, La reforma de la Constitución, Bogotá, Instituto de Estudios Constitucionales Carlos Restrepo Piedrahita, 1998, p. 33. 23