27 A. Arguments of the parties and of the Commission 1. Freedom of expression and the right to a fair trial 76. Regarding freedom of expression, the Commission argued that the statements made by Mr. Lagos del Campo should be understood as part of his work as a representative of a group of workers, which enjoy greater protection under the American Convention. It was clear from reading the whole interview published in “La Razón” that the purpose of the statements was to expose and call attention to acts of undue interference by the employers in the activities of the organizations that represented the workers, and in internal elections of the Industrial Community, because those elections could have an impact on the exercise of the workers’ rights. Consequently, it was not proved that the sanction was really necessary in a democratic society, because evident public interest was involved. The Commission added that the State had not proved that the dismissal responded to an urgent social need; moreover, it could not be argued that it was proportionate to the objective sought.109 Additionally, the Commission argued that the statements made by Mr. Lagos del Campo could have been investigated, corrected or explained by the company and that there were other measures less harmful than dismissal that the company could have used to defend the honor of those who felt that they had been adversely affected. Moreover, the application of restrictions to freedom of expression to protect legitimate aims cannot lead to the imposition of a duty of absolute loyalty to the employer or to subjecting a worker – especially a leader of the workers – to the employer’s interests. 77. With regard to judicial guarantees the Commission argued that the Peruvian Courts had violated Article 8(1) of the American Convention in relation to the obligation to substantiate decisions, because the ruling that upheld the dismissal was “equivalent to a mere rubber-stamp approval of the measure taken by the employer.” This failure to state the reasons for their decisions is enhanced if its recalled that the decision reversed the first instance judgment that had ruled in favor of the worker. 78. Regarding freedom of expression, in general, the representatives agreed with the Commission and emphasized that the statements made by Mr. Lagos del Campo were published based on his position as a representative, so that the workers who were members of the Industrial Community and public opinion, in general, could learn about how the elections were handled within the conflictive labor environment. Moreover, in view of the conflictive context that surrounded the industrial communities, the information on irregularities within them was of public interest. The representatives argued that this information was important for an open discussion in a democratic society and for the 220 employees and manual workers who worked for CeperPirelli at that time. They indicated that, although the Second Labor Court made an interpretation pursuant to Law No. 24514, since the case related to a restriction of freedom of expression, its decision should have weighed this right against the right to reputation, which had been alleged. In addition, the representatives indicated that the sanction was not necessary in a democratic society and was not proportionate to the alleged harm to the right to honor of the company and the personnel. They considered that a civil sanction such as dismissal could be more daunting than a criminal sanction because it had the potential to compromise personal and family life. Nevertheless, the representatives considered that, in light of the existence of a conflict between the rights presumably violated, the individuals who felt that they had been harmed or insulted could have filed a criminal complaint against Mr. Lagos del Campo for offenses against honor or, if appropriate, requested a rectification pursuant to the Press Freedom Statute. Above all, the Commission took into account the position held by Mr. Lagos del Campo, the context in which the statements were made, and the nature and severity of the measure, based on the relationship between the freedom of expression of workers’ representatives and the assertion of rights in this area. Also, since the dismissal was such a severe penalty for both the presumed victim and for the workers and their right to information, it could not be justified by the severity of the harm caused, especially when it is considered that this was not proved in court. 109