both offenses and against all three accused, ordering that the case be closed. 276 The judge based his decision on the following: (i) the statements of the presumed victim were not valid evidence because they lacked credibility and plausibility; (ii) the lack of immediacy of the medical examination and the expert appraisals that were performed, and (iii) the consistent and categorical rejection by the accused of the charges of rape and abuse of authority. 277 210. The judge indicated that the presumed victim’s version of the events was not credible because one of the accused was an important witness in the criminal proceedings underway against one of her brothers.278 211. This Court observes that this consideration reveals that the complaint of rape was automatically considered false on the basis of the procedural situation of the presumed victim’s brother. This was a discretionary and discriminatory criterion that presumed the bad faith of Ms. Rojas Marín when filing the complaint. 212. The dismissal decision also emphasized that “the aggrieved party has not been consistent in her statement regarding the facts.” Among the alleged incongruencies, the judge included the fact that: In [her] complaint in the printed, spoken and televised media, [she] never mentioned that [she] had been subjected to rape, a fact that only recently arose in her version of the events when answering [a question] by the representative of the Public Prosecution Service [in the statement of February 28]; therefore, her words lacked spontaneity, uniformity and consistency in this regard.279 213. This Court recalls that the mention of some of the ill-treatment only in some statements does not mean that these are false or that the facts narrated are not true. 280 Also, when examining the said statements, it should be taken into account that sexual aggressions are a type of offense that victims do not usually report owing to the stigma that a complaint of this type may involve.281 Thus, the Court notes that is it unreasonable to expect that the presumed victim would report such facts in the media and in all the statements she made on what occurred. 214. The judge also considered it incongruent that the presumed victim, “on February 25, after resting and having lunch, resumed [her] usual work (feeding the pigs, cleaning out the pigsties, visiting friends, the media), activities which required considerable physical energy and using motorcycle taxis to move around, as [she herself] states; and [she] would have been unable to do this in the painful condition that [she] described following the supposed sexual abuse.”282 Cf. Order to dismiss the proceedings issued by the Ascope First Preliminary Investigation Court of January 9, 2009 (evidence file, folios 2969 and 2970). 276 Cf. Order to dismiss the proceedings issued by the Ascope First Preliminary Investigation Court of January 9, 2009 (evidence file, folios 2961, 2962 and 2963). 277 Cf. Order to dismiss the proceedings issued by the Ascope First Preliminary Investigation Court of January 9, 2009 (evidence file, folio 2960). 278 Cf. Order to dismiss the proceedings issued by the Ascope First Preliminary Investigation Court of January 9, 2009 (evidence file, folio 2960). 279 Cf. Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 113, and Case of J. v. Peru. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 325. 280 Cf. Case of Rosendo Cantú et al. v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 95, and Case of Favela Nova Brasília v. Brazil. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 16, 2017. Series C No. 333, para. 248. 281 Cf. Order to dismiss the proceedings issued by the Ascope First Preliminary Investigation Court of January 9, 2009 (evidence file, folio 2960). 282 56