127. In view of the foregoing, for this Court there is no doubt that the subject of religious education established in Decree 924 was intended to realize the right to education of students in general terms, and that, although it is true that this subject is optional, it is integrated into the educational program for children. 128. With respect to the so-called “ministerial exception,” the Court understands that it operates in matters related to the functioning of religious communities, such as the determination of the membership of the church, its ministers and its hierarchies. However, when this ministerial exception is applied in other areas, it becomes weaker and less robust, particularly in the field of education in public establishments, where the principles and values of tolerance, full respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and non-discrimination are mandatory for the State. 129. Although the Court considers that the appointment of teachers of a particular religious creed by the religious communities concerned, in accordance with the provisions of Decree 924, may include a certain margin of autonomy, which would be consistent with the right to religious freedom (supra paras. 73 to 83), this cannot be absolute. This is because Catholic religion classes, which are part of a public education program in public schools, financed with public funds, are not within the scope of religious freedom that should be free from any interference by the State, since they are not specifically related to religious beliefs or to the organizational life of the communities. 164 130. Thus, while the Chilean religious authorities have broad autonomy when it comes to granting a certificate of suitability to teach religious education classes, given that this subject is part of the education program for children, these powers, which derive directly from the right to religious freedom, must be adapted to the other rights and obligations in force in the area of equality and nondiscrimination. This power of the religious authorities also applies to the revocation of the certificate of suitability, as long as the rights and obligations of the State in the sphere of public education are respected. 131. Taking into account the foregoing considerations, and having established that the ministerial exception and the discretionary nature of the decisions of religious communities are not applicable in the area of education in public establishments, the Court will now analyze whether in this specific case the rights of Sandra Pavez Pavez were restricted, and whether these restrictions were proportional in light of the rights that are in tension, such as religious freedom. c) Alleged restrictions to Sandra Pavez Pavez’s rights to personal liberty, privacy, equal access to public service and to work 132. In the instant case, the Commission and the representatives alleged that the revocation of Sandra Pavez Pavez’s certificate of suitability had the direct consequence of infringing her rights to privacy and autonomy, to equal access to public service and to work (supra para. 39). 133. With regard to the right to private life recognized by Article 11(2) of the Convention, it was stated that the protection of this right is not limited to the right to privacy; rather, it encompasses a series of factors related to the dignity of the individual, including, for example, the capacity to develop one’s own personality, aspirations, determine one’s identity and define one’s personal relationships. In turn, it was indicated that a central aspect of the recognition of dignity is the right of every human being to self-determination and to freely choose the options and circumstances that give meaning to his or her existence, according to his own choices and convictions. The Court has recognized this right In this regard, it should be recalled that the European Court of Human Rights indicated in the case of Fernández Martínez v. Spain that “a mere allegation by a religious community that there is an actual or potential threat to its autonomy is not sufficient to render any interference with its members’ rights to respect for their private or family life […]. The religious community in question must also show, in light of the circumstances of the individual case, that the risk alleged is probable and substantial and that the impugned interference with the right to respect for private life does not go beyond what is necessary to eliminate that risk.” ECHR, Fernández Martínez v. Spain [GS], No. 56030/07. Judgment of June 12, 2014, para. 132. 164 35