in relation to the latter, the Court considered two additional elements of analysis: the vocation and the prohibition of discrimination. As noted previously, the vocation lacks any legal basis in the judgment, but there is no reason to exclude the prohibition of discrimination in the workplace from the content of Article 23. Thus, if the Court considered it necessary to mention this, it should have done so in relation to the right of access to public service under conditions of equality, since the direct justiciability of this right is not questioned and, consequently, the judgment would have been decided unanimously. In this sense, I reiterate the position according to which the evolutive and pro persona interpretation should be preferred, in order to give content to the rights under the Convention, regarding which the Court does have jurisdiction to rule in the context of contentious cases. 11. Finally, I must emphasize, as I have done in other opinions, that the Court only determines the violation of the ESCER by reiterating the facts and arguments on the basis of which it declares the violation of other rights in the judgment. In this case, in addition to the imprecise mention of vocation, the basis for the violation of the right to work is the disregard of the prohibition of discrimination. This was explained in detail in the initial section as a basis for declaring the State’s responsibility for the violation of Articles 1(1) and 24 of the Convention. Consequently, the scope of protection of both rights in practice was the same, and therefore it was unnecessary to mention Article 26, affecting the legitimacy of the judgment and calling into question the rigor of the Court’s legal analysis. 12. The above is an indication that the majority of the Court intended to reiterate its position in relation to the justiciability of ESCER - with that sole intention and despite having no effect on the specific case. This not only demonstrates the lack of solidity of this jurisprudential position, and its limited practical relevance in the cases that are brought before the Court in general, and in the case of Ms. Pavez in particular; but above all, the lack of rigor in the analysis and determination of the standards in the matter, which instead of consolidating a clear area of protection for each of the rights, weakens its borders and empties its content. Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto Judge Romina I. Sijniensky Deputy Registrar 5