34 95. In what refers to the exercise of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 8 of the American Convention, the Court has established, inter alia, that “it is precise that all requirements designed to protect, guarantee or assert the entitlement to a right be complied with; in other words, the conditions necessary to ensure the adequate representation or management of the interests or claims of those whose rights or obligations are under judicial consideration must be fulfilled.”102 Similarly, “this stipulation of the Convention enshrines the right to a fair trial. From it we can conclude that the States shall not interject obstacles to those people who turn to judges or courts in order to have their rights determined or protected. Any regulation or practice of the domestic order that makes individual access to the courts difficult and is not justified by the reasonable needs of the administration of justice itself, shall be understood as contrary to the previously mentioned Article 8(1) of the Convention.”103 This is especially important in the cases of the forced disappearance of persons since the right to a fair trial also encompasses the right of the victim’s next of kin to access them. 96. As has been established by this Tribunal in other occasions and pursuant with the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in Article 1(1) of the American Convention, in order to guarantee the members of indigenous communities access to justice, “it is necessary that the States grant an effective protection taking into account their specific features, economic and social characteristics, as well as their special situation of vulnerability, their common law, values, uses and customs.”104 97. From the facts established, as well as from the statement offered by Victorina Tiu Tojín, a victim in the present case and the sister of María Tiu Tojín, it can be concluded that the next of kin of the missing victims faced obstacles when accessing justice due to the fact that they belonged to the Mayan Indian People. In this sense, Victorina Tiu Tojín indicated in her statement before the Court that: She turn[ed] to the organizations that supported [her] since they [have] the experience that when they arrive at the court they look at [them] with [their] suits and all, [their] complaints have to wait, and therefore she [had] to turn to these people so the authorities would pay attention to their petitions. […] That she felt fear when turning to the authorities; that they feel great fear of going to an authority or explaining their specific cases to them. […] That none of the State authorities but instead only the organizations supporting her during these processes made the translations, but she did not receive any attention from the State in her language. […]105 102 Cfr. Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25, and 8 American Convention of Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of October 6, 1987. Series A No. 9; para. 28; Case of Lori Berenson Mejía v. Peru. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 25, 2004. Series C No. 119, para. 132; Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of June 17, 2005. Series C No. 125, para. 108. 103 Cfr. Case of Cantos v. Argentina. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 28, 2002. Series C No. 97, para. 50; and Case of Yvon Neptune v. Haiti. Supra note 73, para. 82. 104 Cfr. Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, supra note 102, para. 63; Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of March 29, 2006. Series C No. 146, para. 83; and Case of the Saramaka People v. Surinam. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 28, 2007. Series C No. 172, para. 178. 105 The Court points out that this statement corresponds to the interpretation made from the K’ich’e language to Spanish during the public hearing held on April 30, 2008.