39 military jurisdiction be transferred to the Supreme Court and, according to jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Justice distributed the cases, but there were very few cases. [There is] a new reform […] to the military justice system seeking to go back to the personal jurisdiction again. 117. In what refers to the legislative reform started in the Congress of the Republic of Guatemala, the Court takes note of that indicated by the State in the sense that it has not been “known” of since the year 2005, which seems to be “a factual moratorium.”110 118. The Court has been constant in stating that in a Democratic Constitutional State the military criminal jurisdiction must have a restrictive and exceptional scope: it must only try soldiers for the commission of crimes or offenses that due to their own nature endanger juridical rights of the military order itself.111 In this sense, the Court has stated that “[w]hen the military justice system assumes jurisdiction over a matter that must be heard by the regular justice system, the right to a competent, independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law and, a fortiori, the due process, which is, at the same time, intimately related to the right to a fair trial itself, is affected.112 119. Specifically, this Tribunal has established that the prosecution of grave violations of human rights corresponds to the court of the ordinary jurisdiction.113 In the cases of forced disappearances of persons, Article IX of the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance, to which Guatemala is a party, expressly prohibits the intervention of military courts. The aforementioned article states that “[P]ersons alleged to be responsible for the acts constituting the offense of forced disappearance of persons may be tried only in the competent jurisdictions of ordinary law in each state, to the exclusion of all other special jurisdictions, particularly military jurisdictions. The acts constituting forced disappearance shall not be deemed to have been committed in the course of military duties.” 120. In synthesis, the military criminal jurisdiction has a restrictive and exceptions nature linked to military functions. The acknowledgment of responsibility made by the State and the actions carried out by it reflect this understanding. (supra paras. 14, 15 and 18) Based on its obligations derived from Article 8(1) of the American Convention, which establishes that every person has the right to be heard by a competent judge or court and of the aforementioned Article IX of the Inter-American Convention on Foced Disappearance, the State is compelled to guarantee, as it did in the present case (supra para. 20), the transfer from the military criminal jurisdiction to the regular jurisdiction of those judicial case files that refer to any issue not directly related to the duties of the armed forces, specifically those that imply the 110 In this sense, the State indicated that “the Executive Power has not issued any official determination in this sense, because “there is no instrument that regulates the figure of moratorium in Guatemala” (final written arguments of the State, dossier of Merits, Volume III, folio 586). 111 Cfr. Case of Durand and Ugarte v. Peru. Merits. Judgment of August 16, 2000. Series C No. 68, para. 117; Case of Palamara Iribarne v. Chile. Judgment of November 22, 2005. Series C No. 135, para. 124; Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of January 31, 2006. Series C No. 140, and Case of Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile, supra note 83, para. 131. 112 Cfr. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of May 30, 1999. Series C No. 52, para. 128; Case of Palamara Iribarne v. Chile, supra note 111, para. 143; and Case of Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile, supra note 83, para. 131. 113 Cfr. Case of Durand and Ugarte v. Peru, supra note 111 para. 117; Case of La Cantuta v. Peru, supra note 84, para. 142; and Case of Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile, supra note 83, para. 131.