117. The IACHR considers that the right to be elected to public office, as well as to fulfill the corresponding mandate, constitutes one of the essential attributes of political rights, because restrictions to said right must be aimed to protect the fundamental legal basis, therefore, these must be carefully and rigorously scrutinized. In a case, such as the present case, of a person elected to office by popular vote, it must be taken into consideration that a restriction on the right to active suffrage may not only affect the respective person but also the free expression of the people through universal suffrage.80 Therefore, an arbitrary restriction of political rights that impacts on the right of a person to be elected by popular vote not only affects the rights of that person, it also implies a curtailment of the collective dimension of those rights, and, in sum, significantly influences the democratic system. 118. In relation to the collective dimension of restrictions on political rights, the European Court of Human Rights in Paksas v. Lithuania (concerning the ousting of a President of the Republic, and his later disqualification to become a member of Parliament), stated that: In the Court's view, it is understandable that a State should consider a gross violation of the Constitution or a breach of the constitutional oath to be a particularly serious matter requiring firm action when committed by a person holding that office (…) [h]owever, that is not sufficient to persuade the Court that the applicant's permanent and irreversible disqualification from standing for election as a result of a general provision constitutes a proportionate response to the requirements of preserving the democratic order. (…) Nevertheless, the decision to bar a senior official who has proved unfit for office from ever being a member of parliament in future is above all a matter for voters, who have the opportunity to choose at the polls whether to renew their trust in the person concerned. 81 119. Both the Commission and the Inter-American Court ruled on the sanction of disqualification to hold elected office in light of Article 23 of the American Convention in the Case of Lopez Mendoza v. Venezuela. 120. In that case, the Inter-American Court analyzed Article 23(2) of the American Convention, particularly, the phrase “conviction by a competent court in criminal proceedings,” concluding that restrictions on political rights must be based on the criteria of Article 23(2) of the Convention, and, therefore, that disqualification through an administrative procedure, instead of a criminal one, is prohibited by the American Convention.82 The Court stated that: [W]hich is about a restriction imposed by way of a sanction, it should be about a “conviction by a competent court in criminal proceedings.” None of these requirements have been fulfilled, given that the body that imposed the sanctions was not a "competent court,” there was no "conviction," and the sanctions were not applied as a result of a "criminal proceeding,” where the judicial guarantees enshrined in Article 8 of the American Convention should have been respected. 121. In its merits report in the same case, the Commission analyzed the sanction of disqualification in relation to the express meaning of Article 23(2) of the American Convention. It concluded that “imposing a disqualification from competing for popularly elected office for a period of time is, by nature, a criminal penalty and so the authority imposing it must be required to uphold certain procedural guarantees inherent to 80 ECHR, Case of Hirst v. The United Kingdom, Grand Chamber, October 6, 2005, para.62; See also Article 3 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter. 81 ECHR, Case of Paksas v. Lithuania, Grand Chamber, Judgment of January 6, 2011, paras. 104-105. 82 I/A Court of H.R., Case of López Mendoza v. Venezuela. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 1, 2011. Series C No. 233, paras. 105 and following. 22