obligation cannot depend upon the procedural initiative of the victims or their next of kin or on their offer of probative elements (supra para. 218). 236. Finally, the Court observes that, in this case, the investigations were closed without the State having provided a satisfactory and convincing explanation about what happened in order to disprove the presumption of State responsibility for the torture suffered by Lucas Matías Mendoza and Claudio David Núñez (supra para. 235). In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the State is responsible for the violation of Articles 8(1), and 25(1) of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) of this treaty, as well as for the failure to comply with the obligations established in Articles 1, 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, to the detriment of Lucas Matías Mendoza and Claudio David Núñez. C. Right to appeal the sentence C.1. Arguments of the Commission and pleadings of the parties 237. The Inter-American Commission argued that, owing to the applicable legal framework and the existence of a deep-rooted judicial practice of interpreting it restrictively, there was a serious limitation to the perspectives of effectiveness of any allegation that did not fall within what had historically been considered “reviewable” by cassation. It argued that each appeal filed by the defense counsel of the presumed victims was rejected because it sought the review of factual matters and of assessment of evidence, and this is incompatible with the broad scope of the remedy provided for in Article 8(2)(h) of the American Convention. According to the Commission, “in this specific case, [this] was especially serious, because of the nature of the sentence imposed on the victims and their special condition at the time they committed the conducts they were charged with.” Consequently, the Commission indicated that it was “understandable that the victims’ defense counsel, in seeking for the appeal to be admitted and decided, did not request a review of factual matters or of assessment of evidence”; but, instead, they formulated arguments “based above all on the application of incorrect laws, on the unconstitutionality of the sentence, or on its manifest arbitrariness.” In that sense, the Commission indicated that it should be taken “into account that the victims began the review stage with a constraint a priori regarding the arguments they could present.” The Commission referred to the Casal judgment, cited by the State (infra para. 239), and affirmed that it “assessed it positively and underst[ood] it as a first effort to harmonize judicial practice with Argentina’s international obligations in the area of human rights.” Nevertheless, it indicated that the judgment “has not inspired sufficient changes.” It considered that the State has made progress in ensuring the right to appeal a judgment, but significant challenges remained to the full realization of this right. Consequently, the Commission asked the Court to declare that the State had violated the right recognized in Article 8(2)(h) of the American Convention, in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 thereof to the detriment of César Alberto Mendoza, Claudio David Núñez, Lucas Matías Mendoza, Saúl Cristian Roldán Cajal and Ricardo David Videla Fernández. 238. The representative claimed that the victims’ sentences had not been subject to a comprehensive review “because the courts did not authorize a review of facts that had been decided [and because] they had not made an effective analysis of the arguments submitted in each objection,” owing to legislation that “restricted the review mechanisms.” Regarding the Casal judgment, the representative argued that “despite [its] symbolic impact […], to date, the State has not modified the legal grounds that prevent a broad review of guilty verdicts, as in [the instant cases].” Regarding the particular cases of the presumed victims, in general, the representative agreed with the Commission’s arguments. Lastly, regarding 78