2) When the contested judgment was founded on documentary or testimonial evidence the falseness of which has been declared in a subsequent irrevocable judgment. 3) If the conviction has been pronounced as a result of malfeasance, bribery, or another offense the existence of which has been declared in a subsequent irrevocable judgment. 4) When, following the conviction, new facts or probative elements supervene or are discovered, which alone or together with those already examined in the proceedings, clearly establish that the act did not exist, that the convicted person did not commit it, or that the act committed falls under a more favorable criminal law. 5) If the judgment is based on an interpretation of the law that is more onerous that the one upheld by the Supreme Court of Justice when the appeal is filed. 6) It the consent required by articles 359 and 418 was not given by the convicted person. 260. The Court observes that both cases refer to a special remedy that is appropriate against final judgments in certain circumstances. While the Court assesses positively that, in the instant case, the review of the convictions of César Alberto Mendoza, Claudio David Núñez and Lucas Matías Mendoza was obtained by the appeals for review after approximately 12 years, this type of remedy does not satisfy the right established in Article 8(2)(h) of the American Convention as regards the possibility of filing an appeal before the conviction becomes final and res judicata. However, the Court will take into account the decisions taken in the appeals for review in the chapter on reparations of this Judgment (infra paras. 328 to 332). 261. Based on the foregoing, because the appeal in cassation of the judgment was not sufficient to guarantee César Alberto Mendoza, Claudio David Núñez, Lucas Matías Mendoza, Saúl Cristian Roldán Cajal and Ricardo David Videla Fernández the right to appeal the judgment, the Court considers that Argentina violated the right recognized in Article 8(2)(h) of the American Convention, in relation to Articles 19, 1(1) and 2 of this instrument, to their detriment. D. Right to defense D.1. Arguments of the Commission and pleadings of the parties 262. The Commission indicated that the State had not argued or proved that César Alberto Mendoza had been notified personally of the decision rejecting the special federal appeal filed in his favor (supra para. 95 and infra paras. 326 and 327), or that his defense counsel had advised him about it. According to the Commission, the information available reveals that “both circumstances led to his inability to continue defending himself up until the last instances provided for by domestic law,” so that subparagraphs (e) and (d) of Article 8(2) of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) of this instrument, were violated to his detriment. Regarding Saúl Cristian Roldán Cajal, the Commission also argued that it did not have “documentation indicating that […] he was notified personally or was aware of [the decision rejecting the appeal in cassation that had been filed].” Similarly, with regard to César Alberto Mendoza, the Commission considered that the State “had failed to meet the burden of proof” and, “[t]aking into account that additional remedies could have been filed against this decision,” it affirmed that the right to a defense of Saúl Cristian Roldán Cajal, recognized in subparagraphs (d) and (e) of Article 8(2) of the American Convention, in relation to the obligations established in Article 1(1) of this instrument, was violated. 263. The representative argued that the Court has recognized the “right to defense counsel,” but that did not imply excluding the party concerned from the proceedings. In this regard, she affirmed that, in order to guarantee the right to a broad review of the guilty verdict and in accordance with the “obligation to provide information,” the defense lawyer must “notify his or her client of decisions involving them.” In addition, the representative 86