316. The Court considers that, in view of the said difference in treatment among persons born in the territory of the Dominican Republic based on normative regulations (or on practices or decisions that determined their application or interpretation), 359 the State must prove that this differentiated treatment does not entail, with regard to the group of persons who, having been born in Dominican territory, are unable to acquire the nationality of this country, a violation of the right to equal protection of the law. In this regard, the Court has established that a difference in treatment is discriminatory when it does not have a reasonable and objective justification; 360 in other words, when it does not seek a legitimate purpose and there is no reasonable proportional relationship between the means used and the end sought. 361 317. In this regard, the Court notes that, as already mentioned (supra para. 285), in judgment TC/0168/13 the Constitutional Court indicated that, contrary to the children of aliens who “obtain a legal residence permit,” “[a]liens who […] are in an irregular migratory situation […] cannot claim that their children born in the country have the right to obtain Dominican nationality […] because it is legally inadmissible to found the inception of a right on a de facto illegal situation.” The Inter-American Court notes that the argument concerning the “illegal situation” of the alien who “is in an irregular migratory situation,” refers to aliens in an irregular situation, and not to their children. In other words, the difference between those born in Dominican territory who are children of aliens is not made based on a situation related to them, but based on the different situation of their parents as regards whether they are regular or irregular migrants. Thus, this distinction between the situations of the parents, in itself, does not explain the justification or purpose of the difference in treatment between individuals who were born in Dominican territory. Consequently, the Court understand that the arguments set forth in judgment TC/0168/13 are insufficient, because they do not explain the objective sought by the distinction examined and, therefore, they prevent an assessment of whether it is reasonable and proportionate. 318. As already mentioned (supra para. 264), the obligation to provide every individual with the equal and effective protection of the law without discrimination establishes a limit to the State’s authority to determine those who are its nationals. The Court finds no reason to differ from its opinion in its judgment in the case of the Yean and Bosico Girls v. Dominican Republic, that “the migratory status of a person is not transmitted to his or her children.” 362 Thus, the introduction of the standard of the irregular permanence of the parents as an exception to the acquisition of nationality by ius solis was discriminatory in the Dominican Republic, when it was applied in a context that has previously been 359 It should be emphasized that the said difference in treatment is between those born in the State’s territory, and not with regard to their parents. The Court takes note that expert witness Gómez Pérez indicated that “regarding nationality, acquisitive prescription or usucaption does not exist; hence, regardless of the time that [a person] has allowed to elapse, first, violating a law; second, without regularizing his status, […] the fact that the [said] persons] let 5, 10, 15, 20, [or] 30 years go by, does not give them the right to […] acquire the right to nationality by acquisitive prescription.” Nevertheless, the hypothesis examined is not that of the person who, being an alien, is in an irregular situation in the territory of the State, which is the one indicated by the expert witness, but rather that of those who were born on this territory. (Cf. Expert opinion provided by Cecilio Gómez Pérez before the Court during the public hearing). 360 Cf. Juridical Status and Human Rights of the Child. OC-17/02, para. 46; Juridical Status and Rights of Undocumented Migrants. OC-18/03, para. 84, and Case of Norín Catrimán et al. (Leaders, members and activist of the Mapuche Indigenous People) v. Chile, para. 200. 361 Cf. Case of Norín Catrimán et al. (Leaders, members and activist of the Mapuche Indigenous People) v. Chile, para. 200. (This judgment cites the following case law: ECHR, Case of D.H. et al. v. Czech Republic, No. 57325/00. Judgment of 13 November 2007, para. 196, and ECHR, Case of Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06. Judgment of 22 December 2009, para. 42.) 362 Case of the Yean and Bosico Girls v. Dominican Republic, para. 156. 103