judgment TC/0168/13 that, from 1929 on, documentation had been granted that “presumed” the Dominican nationality of persons who, according to the legal interpretations made in that judgment, were not Dominicans. Thus, these “Consideranda” indicated that, in the said judicial ruling “the Constitutional Court referred […] to what it called ‘the unanticipated legal issues of the Dominican immigration policy and the institutional and bureaucratic shortcomings of the Civil Registry,’ indicating that these unanticipated issues ‘go back to the time immediately after the proclamation of the Constitution of […] June 20, 1929,’ which resulted in a number of persons born in Dominican territory receiving from the Dominican State documentation suggesting that they were Dominican nationals, as a result of which they had specific certainties and expectations in their life as citizens based on that condition.” In addition, Cristóbal Rodríguez Gómez, in his expert opinion, stated that “the Central Electoral Board began, more than six years ago, to revoke the nationality of […] [persons] who had been born 15, 20, 30 and 40 years before the new General Migration Law 285-04 was enacted.” The statement of the expert witness reveals that, prior to 2004, Dominican nationality had been granted to persons who, eventually and only as a result of legal criteria that was explicitly indicated subsequently, did not comply with the requirements to possess it. 296. In addition, as the State itself has admitted (supra para. 245), it is not possible to establish regulations that result in the risk of persons born in their territory being stateless. In this regard, the Court has indicated that “the condition of being born in the territory of a State is the only one that needs to be proved in order to acquire nationality, in the case of those who would not have the right to another nationality if they did not acquire that of the State where they were born.” 343 Accordingly, it is relevant to examine the State’s argument that the presumed victims would be able to acquire Haitian nationality because Haiti allegedly applies the system of ius sanguinis to grant nationality (supra para. 247). 297. On this point, the Court notes that the State’s argument that is relevant to this case consisting in the mere assertion that, in Haiti, nationality is regulated by ius sanguinis is insufficient. This is because the State has not proved that the presumed victims who never obtained Dominican nationality are, in fact, able to obtain Haitian nationality. 344 343 Cf. Case of the Yean and Bosico Girls v. Dominican Republic, para. 156.c. 344 The State presented as evidence the expert opinion of Cecilio Gómez Pérez who indicated, referring to the 1987 Haitian Constitution, that “every child of a Haitian mother or father, regardless of his or her place of birth, is born a Haitian, is Haitian, and possesses by descent, by ius sanguinis, Haitian nationality; therefore, the fact of not benefiting from nationality by ius soli, owing to the Dominican constitutional exception, could never [result in the child] being stateless […].” Even though the expert opinion of Mr. Gómez Pérez related to Dominican law and not to Haitian law, the Court took note of his assertion insofar as it relates to the evaluation of the Dominican nationality regime, in aspects that may have an impact on the situation of the presumed victims. Despite this, the Court notes that when the expert witness was questioned in person by the representatives about whether he knew the “1984 Haitian Law on Nationality which establishes two restrictions in its articles 7 and 8,” the State indicated that “[the law mentioned by the representative of the presumed victims does not form part of the purpose for which the expert witness was summoned.” After the President of the Court had consulted the expert witness as to whether he could “respond to the clarification” requested by the representatives, Mr. Gómez Pérez made observations in which he failed to indicate whether he was aware of the said Haitian law. Consequently, the Court considers that the assertions of the expert witness concerning the supposed impossibility of statelessness were insufficient. Meanwhile, expert witness Julia Harrington, in considerations based, according to her, on “guidelines” of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees adopted, according to the expert witness, in relation to the “1954 Convention […] relating to the Status of Stateless Persons”, indicated that “a theoretical nationality available in another State does not constitute citizenship of that State. Although it may be considered that a person possesses or can obtain another nationality owing to his ethnic or national background, it cannot be presumed that he has that nationality unless he possesses proof or recognition of this; in particular, the possibility of claiming another nationality does not, of itself, constitute nationality” (italics in the original text). The Court understands that the observations of the expert witness are appropriate also for the examination of the State obligations under Articles 1(1) and 20 of the American Convention. The expert witness referred to “guidelines,” citing a document that she indicated was entitled “UNHCR, Guidelines on Statelessness No. 1: The definition of ‘Stateless Person’ in Article I (1) of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 96