8. In its most recent brief on this measure of reparation, presented on November 7, 2002, the Commission indicated that the State “refers only to bills and not to amendments of the anti-terrorist laws,” in such a way that “it was inhibited from making further observations.” ii) Information available in the framework of cases before the Court 9. Regarding the adaptation of domestic law to the American Convention, the Court notes that the State has referred to a judgment delivered by the Constitutional Court on January 3, 2003 (supra Considering clause 6). This judgment examined many of the principal arguments concerning Peru’s anti-terrorist legislation. Furthermore, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to monitor compliance with regard to other cases concerning Peru that involve the obligation to adapt the same legislation, this Court has examined the new anti-terrorist laws issued after said ruling of the Constitutional Court, as well as its judgment of August 9, 2006, in which it declared unfounded the complaint that the new legislation was unconstitutional. These elements allow the Court to make a general assessment of some of the measures adopted by the State to comply with the reform of domestic laws as a result of the violations declared in this Judgment. 10. Regarding the problems concerning the codification of crimes as this applies to the crime of treason, the Court observes that the Judgment handed down by the Peruvian Constitutional Court in 2003 declared that Articles 1 and 2 of Decree Law No. 25.659 were unconstitutional and, by their connection, Articles 3, 4, 5, 65 and 7 thereof, in relation to the crime of treason. Indeed, the Constitutional Court indicated that “all the factual assumptions described in [said] definition of the crime […] equate to pre-existing methods of terrorism[, which results in] duplication of the same content,” “thus making it possible that one and the same act could indistinctly be subsumed in either of the crimes” and “affecting the principle of criminal legality.”6 11. Furthermore, the Court takes note that, in the 2003 judgment of the Constitutional Court, it declared the subsistence of Article 2 of Decree Law No. 25.475, relating to the crime of terrorism, with the same text, provided that it is interpreted that the action must be carried out “intentionally,” because there is a reasonable uncertainty and “[t]he clauses of analogical interpretation do not violate the principle of lex certa when the legislator establishes exemplary assumptions that can serve as parameters [for interpretation].”7 5 Regarding article 6 of Decree Law No. 25,659, concerning the application for habeas corpus, by connection, the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional the phrase ‘or treason’ so “that said precept will subsist as follows: ‘The application for habeas corpus is admissible under the assumptions established in article 12 of Law No. 23,506, in favor of those detained, accused or prosecuted for the crimes of terrorism,’” and the following procedural norms must be observed. Cf. Judgment of the Constitutional Court of Peru issued on January 3, 2003 (Exp. No. 010-2002-AI/TC), para. 42. 6 Cf. Judgment of the Constitutional Court of Peru, supra note 5, paras. 38 and 39. The Court observes that the Constitutional Court declared that its judgment did “not automatically annul judicial proceedings where sentences had been handed down for the crime of treason under the provisions of Decree Law No. 25,659 declared unconstitutional. Nor should it be derived from this declaration of unconstitutionality that individuals who have been sentenced and convicted cannot be tried again for the crime of terrorism, because as the Constitutional Court has established […], the same assumptions prohibited by Decree Law 25,659 are regulated by Decree Law 25,475.” Consequently, the Court underscores that the Constitutional Court indicated that “once the legislator has regulated the indicated procedural avenue […], the possibility of proposing that a new criminal proceedings be held must be conditioned to it being held at the prior request of the interested party.” Also, that the Constitutional Court had “urge[d] the Legislature to promulgate, within a reasonable time, ways and means for eventually processing the specific claims referred to above.”Cf. Judgment of the Constitutional Court of Peru, supra note 5, para. 230. 7 Cf. Thus, according to the Constitutional Court “the interpretation of the clause ‘against the security of (...) ways or means of communication or transport of any kind,” must restrict its scope to conducts that constitute the crime against public security that affect ways or means of transport or communication. For the 4