29 that “the defendant only admitted to having hired Julián Jaimes as an Army guide, and that under the same Army regulations, he was authorized to provide Mr. Jaimes with the required uniforms and arms.”69 Furthermore, the abovementioned Superior Tribunal of Public Order (supra para. 95), upon an examination of Lieutenant Andrade’s actions in light of these military regulations, found that: In order to accomplish his mission [to fight guerrillas in the area under his command], he resorted to private individuals with the objective of forming a united front against insurgents. This action was the origin of the illegal and injurious actions which are under examination. It is not possible to detach his military status from the acts attributed to him, as they are inherent to and result from the special status of their perpetrator. Not only is it obvious that in undertaking such actions the Officer overstepped the limits of his authority, but also that he always performed them in his capacity as a member of the Armed Forces and with the specific purpose of accomplishing a mission. […]70 (emphasis supplied) 97. Upon analyzing the case of Lieutenant Andrade, and taking into consideration the military regulations referred to above (supra para. 88 and 89), the Military Preliminary Criminal Investigations Court 126 [Juzgado 126 de Instrucción Penal Militar], stated that “the fact that he resorted to civilians to accomplish his mission [and provided them with military uniforms and arms], was not a decision taken on his own initiative, but a tactic that has long been used by our Colombian Army, as is demonstrated by the National Army Regulations [for Counter-guerrilla Combat, fourth edition, 1987].”71 Additionally, in the judgments rendered by the Administrative Court of Santander [Tribunal Administrativo de Santander] and by the Council of State regarding the case of the Rochela Massacre, the relationship between the application of the abovementioned regulations and the formation and support of the paramilitary group, which carried out the massacre has also been recognized. The Administrative Court of Santander found that Lieutenant Andrade’s actions were undertaken “in the performance of his duties and by availing himself of his status as a military member, he organized and supported armed groups who perpetrated [the massacre],” whereby “the violations committed by this officer were linked to his duties, thus proving the relationship between them.”72 For its part, the Council of State argued that “the above officer undertook such activities [, providing the Los Masetos paramilitary group with arms and uniforms which were for the exclusive use of the State’s security forces,] in the performance of his duties, in that his actions may not possibly be deemed to be private and independent from service,” whereby it “may be inferred that the violation committed by this officer was linked to his service and, therefore, his illegal actions entail State responsibility.”73 69 Cf. supra note 67 (page 499). 70 Cf. supra note 67 (pages 502 and 503). 71 Cf. judgment rendered on October 31, 1989 by the Military Preliminary Criminal Investigations Court 126 (record of evidences to the application, volume II, evidence A52, page 853 and 854). 72 Cf. judgment rendered on February 1, 1994 by the Administrative Court of Santander in the proceedings instigated by the victim Carlos Fernando Castillo-Zapata’s next of kin (record of evidence submitted by the State on November 8, 2006, pages 6798 and 6801); and judgment rendered on October 6, 1995 by the Third Division of the Contentious Administrative Courts of the Council of State (record of evidences to the brief containing pleadings and motions, volume v, evidence 23, page 3245). 73 Cf. judgment rendered on September 4, 1997 by the Third Division of the Contentious Administrative Courts of the Council of State (record of evidences to the brief containing the answer to the application, volume III, evidence 32, pages 5377 and 5379).