27 Convention, which would be useless if it was impossible to begin the proceedings in the first place.114 84. Irrespective of the fact that the decision of the Gonaïves Court of Appeal has not been notified to Mr. Neptune and is not final, the Court finds that the information provided by the State constitutes an acknowledgement that the criminal proceedings opened against him were simply inadequately instituted. That is, that the subsequent actions in the context of these criminal proceedings would be invalid in toto, because they were conducted by courts that did not have competence, at least initially, to hear the facts of which Mr. Neptune was accused. In the context described (supra paras. 50 and 51), the Court considers that this case arose in a situation of normative and practical impediments to real access to justice, as well as in a general situation of absence of guarantees, juridical uncertainty and the ineffectiveness of the judicial institutions to deal with facts such as those of the instant case. Hence, from the outset, the State failed in its obligation to guarantee Mr. Neptune his right to be heard by a competent court in the substantiation of the charges against him in the terms of Article 8(1) of the Convention, as well as his right to an effective recourse, protected by Article 25 of the Convention, because he did not have access to a competent court within a reasonable time. 85. Regarding the other arguments raised by the Commission: that “the closing order was contrary to the principle of consistency, and that it should have ordered that Mr. Neptune be brought before a court with a jury” (supra paras. 46 and 47), the Court finds that the said order was clearly ambiguous, unclear and inconsistent in the way in which the facts were alleged. If the factual description of the alleged facts is imprecise, the essential reference point for adequately exercising the right to defense is non-existent. 115 Nevertheless, even assuming that the closing order constituted the accusation under the Haitian criminal procedural system, it is not possible to examine its consistency, as the Commission suggests, because there was no guilty verdict that would allow this, either at the time the proceedings before this Court initiated, or subsequently because this is not the nature of the decision of the Gonaïves Court of Appeal of April 13, 2007. Consequently, in this regard, the precedent cited by the Commission is not applicable. * * * 86. In brief, as has been established, Mr. Neptune is currently in a situation of juridical uncertainty, because he was criminally prosecuted and kept in prison for more than two years by order of a court that was not legally competent. This is aggravated by the fact that the abovementioned decision of the Gonaïves Court of Appeal has still not been duly notified. This situation has resulted in an unjustified delay in access to justice, prolonged Mr. Neptune’s situation of uncertainty, and has not allowed him to obtain a final ruling from a competent judge concerning the charges made against him. In a context of normative and practical obstacles to real access to justice, together with a general situation of absence of guarantees, juridical uncertainty and the inability of the judicial institutions to deal with facts such as those of the instant case, the international responsibility of the State has arisen because it has failed in its obligation to guarantee Mr. Neptune’s right to accede to, and be heard within a reasonable time by, a competent court in the substantiation of the 114 Likewise, cf. Eur Court H.R., Golder v. United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A, No. 18, paras. 28-36, and Eur Court H.R., Baskiene v. Lithuania, Judgment, 24 July 1975, paras. 78-79. 115 Cf. Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala, supra note 48, para. 68.