46 this obligation to make reparation are regulated by international law.207 In its decision in this regard, the Court has based itself on Article 63(1) of the American Convention. 153. In keeping with the above-mentioned findings on merits and the violations of the Convention declared in the preceding chapters, as well as in light of the criteria established in the Court’s case law in relation to the nature and scope of the obligation to repair,208 the Court will proceed to examine the claims submitted by the Commission and by the representative concerning reparations, in order to decide on measures tending to repair the damage. A) INJURED PARTY 154. The Court will determine who should be considered an “injured party” in the terms of Article 63(1) of the American Convention and, consequently, eligible for the reparations the Court establishes. 155. First, the Court finds that Yvon Neptune is the “injured party,” as a victim of the violations of the Convention that have been declared, so that he is eligible for any reparations that the Court establishes for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, if applicable. 156. In addition, in its final written arguments, the Commission asked that, “considering the damage and suffering caused to the victim’s family members […], they also should be considered beneficiaries of reparations”; 209 however, it did not identify these family members. The representative in his final written arguments, and Mr. Neptune in his statement, requested that, when determining the reparations, the Court bear in mind “the inability of Marie Jose Neptune [Mr. Neptune’s wife] to work during his detention, owing to her constant travel between Haiti, where she helped her husband, and the United States, where her daughter lives and where she feels safe; because she found it hard to concentrate on her work owing to the uncertainty about Mr. Neptune’s situation and the fear that someone would kill him or that he would die of an illness or as a result of his hunger strike. 157. In this regard, the Court has verified that the facts described in the preceding paragraph do not appear among the facts set out in the application filed by the Commission in this case. Also, the representative did not present a brief with pleas and motions, in which he could have referred to this situation. In this regard, the Court reaffirms its case law that, in principle, “it is not admissible to allege new facts, distinct from those set out in 207 Cf. Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname. Reparations and costs. Judgment of September 10, 1993. Series C No. 15, para. 44; The Saramaka People v. Suriname, supra note 36, para. 186, and Boyce et al. v. Barbados, supra note 47, para. 117. 208 Cf. Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Reparations and costs, supra note 206, paras. 25-26; Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina. Reparations and costs. Judgment of August 27, 1998. Series C No. 39, para. 43, and The “White Van” (Paniagua Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Reparations and costs, supra note 39, paras. 76-79. See also, La Cantuta v. Perú, supra note 42, paras. 200-203, and The Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Perú, supra note 39, paras. 414-416 209 Cf. Final written arguments presented by the Commission, supra note 19, para. 65 (folio 314).