14 35. Furthermore, the Commission filed the arguments regarding said preliminary objection and pointed out that in the admissibility stage, the State has alleged the nonexhaustion of domestic remedies on the ground that the representatives should resort to the administrative means in order to object the acts of the State agencies, but that, despite the fact that Salvador Chiriboga siblings used the administrative remedies they considered appropriate, such recourses have no final decision due to “[…] serious problems affecting the administration of justice of Ecuador". 36. Based on the foregoing, the Commission further alleged that the State, however, did not refer to the non- exhaustion of domestic remedies regarding the condemnation proceedings in the admissibility stage, but that it did refer to such in the answer to the application before the Court, in which the State argued that the expropriation proceedings was still pending. Therefore, the Commission pointed out that Ecuador was presenting arguments that were different from the ones put forward in the admissibility stage, which is inadmissible. 37. Finally, the Commission argued that the State has not "[...] furnished new elements that justify a new revision by the Court […of] an issue already duly solved by the [Commission…]” in the Report on Admissibility. Furthermore, the Commission deems it appropriate for the Court to take up the case and also it requested the Court to deny the preliminary objection raised by the State. 38. In the arguments regarding this preliminary objection, the representatives pointed out that when they filed the initial petition with the Commission, the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies was fulfilled, "[...] on the ground of the order of the Court on Constitutional matters that denied [a] writ of amparo in the last resort […] " filed by the alleged victim, in which the violation of several rules of the Convention was invoked. They further argued that the first time the State alleged the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies was at the hearing held before the Commission, on March 2, 2000 but that the State did not specify the remedies that remain to be exhausted. 39. Furthermore, the representatives agreed, mainly, with the arguments presented by the Commission, though they further alleged that the fact of not raising this objection in the admissibility stage before the Commission entailed an implied waiver of the right to raise it in the petition's answer before the Court. As a consequence, they alleged that the State’s procedural opportunity had expired and therefore, requested the Court to deny the objection. 40. With regard to the objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies filed by the State, the Tribunal reasserts the criteria established in the case-law related to the filing of the preliminary objection that needs to be considered in the instant case. In the first place, the Court has pointed out that the non- exhaustion of domestic remedies is an issue related to pure admissibility and that the State who asserts such objection must specify the domestic remedies that remain to be exhausted, as well as prove that those remedies are effective.32 In the second place, in order for the objection on nonexhaustion of domestic remedies to be timely, it must be pled in the State’s first submission before the Commission; otherwise, it is presumed that the State has tacitly 32 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Preliminary Objections . Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No. 1, para. 88; and Case of Boyce et al. v. Barbados. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 20, 2007. Series C N°. 169, para. 25; and Case of the Saramaka People, supra note 21, para. 43.