2 State acknowledged the mistake committed in the incorrect collection of taxes from and the penalties imposed on Mrs. Salvador Chiriboga. The Court wishes to repeat that when an State invokes reasons of general interest or public welfare to limit the human rights, those reasons will be subjected to an interpretation strictly limited to “just demands” of a “democratic society" that takes into account the balance between the different interests at stake and the needs of preserving the purpose and end of the Convention. The Court considers that the authority of the State to limit the right to property requires balancing between the general interest and the interest of the individual. Therefore, the State should use all the less costly means to damage the least the right of a person. Accordingly, Article 21 of the Convention refers to the payment of a just compensation, which, according to this Tribunal, must be adequate, prompt and effective, since the compensation is one of the measures through which the State can comply with the goal of achieving a fair balance between the general interest and the individual interest. In such sense, the Court considers that in order to analyze the combination of a fair balance in the instant case, it is necessary to note whether there has been a just compensation, as well as other relevant factors such as the passage of excessive terms, out of proportions burdens or situations of uncertainty regarding the rights of the owner, that infringe the fair balance that Article 21 tries to protect, as well as the purpose and end of the Convention. The European Court has also pointed out that the principle of fair balance implies that no all deprivation is, in principle, legal due to social or public interest.1 All limitation, necessarily, must entail a reasonable relation of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realized by any measures applied by the State, including measures designed to control the use of the individual's property.2 Said principle consists in the balance that must be struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights.3 Moreover, the Court has pointed out in previous cases, that there is a need of looking behind the mere appearances, in order to ascertain the real situation behind the reported situation.4 In this sense, the European Corut, in relation to the scopes and effects that the limit to the right to property may have in a certain situation, has pointed out "[w]henever there is no formal expropriation, that is to say, no ownership of the land in question has been transferred, the Court considers that it has to look behind the appearances and investigate the realities of the situation, […].5 1 Cf. ECHR, James v UK, Judgment of February 1985, Application no. 8793/79, para. 46. Cf. ECHR, Case Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, Judgment of 22 February 2005, Application no. 35014/97, para. 93. 3 Cf. ECHR, Case Hutten-Czapska, supra nota **, para. 93; ECHR, Case Matos e Silva, Ltda.,and others v. Portugal, Judgment of 27 August 1996, Application no. 15777/89, para. 86; y ECHR, Case Sporrong and Lönnroth V. Sweden, Judgment of 22 September 1982, Applications nos. 7151/75; 7152/75, para. 69. 4 Cf. Case of Ivcher Bronstein V. Perú. Judgment of February 6, 2001. Series C No. 74, para. 124. See also: ECHR, Case Belvedere Alberghiera S.R.L., supra note **, para. 53. ECHR, Case Papamichalopoulos and others V. Greece, Judgment of 24 January 1993, Application no. 14556/89, para. 42; and ECHR, Case Sporrong and Lönnroth, supra nota **, para. 63. 5 Cf. ECHR, Case Sporrong and Lönnroth, supra note **, para. 63; ECHR, Case of Papamichalopoulos and others, supra note **, para. 42. 2