31 108. On this point, the State submitted that it will provide the following information to the Governor General of Barbados, so that he may consider the exercise of the prerogative of mercy: (1) the judgment of the Court in the case of Boyce et al. v. Barbados; (2) the Report on the Merits of the Commission (Report No. 60/08), and (3) the “Report of Barbados on Measures Adopted to Comply with [the] Judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Case of Boyce et al. v. Barbados, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 169, Judgment of November 20, 2007, and its appendices.” According to the State, “the commutation of a death sentence is an appropriate and sufficient form of reparation.” Therefore, further “reparations are unnecessary and inappropriate in the present case.” It indicated, also, that the Barbados Privy Council has not yet convened to consider Mr. DaCosta Cadogan’s case because, pursuant to the decision of the CCJ in the case of Attorney General et al. v. Jeffrey Joseph and Lennox Ricardo Boyce, it should refrain from doing so until all of the applicant’s legal processes, including international petitions, are concluded.88 Moreover, the State asked that the Court “reject any requirement that the Petitioner be entitled to a re-sentencing hearing before either a High Court judge or the Court of Appeal.” It argued that admitting such a request would place the Court in “the uncomfortable and inappropriate role of being a further [l]egislature for Barbados[, since the] modalities of compliance with a judgment of this […] Court are matters [to be decided upon by] the State, within its margin of appreciation.” Additionally, the State argued that “issues related to re-sentencing [will] only become relevant for the Court once [a new] legislative framework [in which the mandatory death penalty is abolished] has been adopted. At that time, only if the solutions enacted by Barbados in compliance with the Court’s order in the case of Boyce et al. v. Barbados are considered inappropriate […] will such questions arise. In the unlikely event that this happens, then this Court is fully capable of addressing all such matters.” Finally, the State indicted that the issues regarding the commutation of the death penalty raised by the defendants “are likely to be resolved by the Barbadian Court of Appeal in the near future. An application has been made seeking leave to appeal the decision […] in the case of Frank Anderson Carter v. Attorney General and Anthony Leroy Austin v. Attorney General to clarify certain aspects of the law. [That case] establishe[d, inter alia,] that […] the Privy Council […] must allow the applicant to see and comment upon the documents being considered when making a recommendation in relation to the prerogative of mercy.” 109. In the Boyce et al. case, this Tribunal ordered the State to commute the death sentence imposed on one of the victims. Nevertheless, contrary to what was ordered in that case, the Tribunal considers that the proper reparation in the present case should take into account that “sentencing is a judicial function” (supra para. 56),89 and that the commutation of a sentence corresponds to a non-judicial process. Therefore, the Court considers that, in the present case, as a measure of reparation for the violations declared in the present Judgment, the State must set aside and not carry out the death sentence already imposed 88 The CCJ indicated in the case of Attorney General et al. v. Jeffrey Joseph and Lennox Ricardo Boyce that it “would recommend that the [Barbados’ Privy Council] should meet only once and that they should do so at the very end of all the domestic and international processes. At that stage they should make available to the condemned man all the material upon which they propose to make their decision, give him reasonable notice of the date of the meeting and invite him to submit written representations. This does not of course preclude the Governor-General in his or her discretion from convening at any time a meeting of the [Barbados’ Privy Council] with a view to achieving a consensus on commutation if the Governor-General considers there is a strong case for a commutation. If there is no decision in fav[o]r of commutation, then further deliberation would have to be adjourned.” Attorney General et al. v. Jeffrey Joseph and Lennox Ricardo Boyce (2006) CCJ Appeal No CV 2 of 2006, BB Civil Appeal No 29 of 2004 (November 8, 2006) (case file of appendices to the application, volume 2, folios 502 to 567). 89 Case of Boyce et al., supra note 20, paras. 47 and 60.